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CHINA'S GATT BID:
WHY ALL THE FUSS ABOUT CURRENCY CONTROLS?
Chris Brown
Abstract: China did not succeed in its bid to join the General Agreement on Tariffs
and Trade (GATT) during the Uruguay Round. A key stumbling block was China's
mechanism of exchange rate controls. From the mid-1980s to the end of 1993, China
used a dual-rate currency mechanism, administering these rates through a loose network
of about 100 exchange centers ("swap centers"). The swap centers helped to create par-
tial convertibility of the Chinese currency and were instrumental in creating incentives
for China's exporters and in attracting foreign investment. However, the swap centers
also caused trade conflicts with the U.S. and within GATT. China was accused of using
its dual rates to subsidize its state sector, and of using the swap centers as a means to
block imports by limiting access to foreign exchange. Meeting privately, the GATT
working party was no doubt concerned that GATT and IMF rules would be inadequate to
police China's exchange rate policies if China was admitted to GATT. Not surprisingly,
the working party decided to reject China's bid. In 1994. China unified its dual-rate re-
gime and established an inter-bank market for foreign exchange. While China continues
to seek a seat within GATT's successor, the World Trade Organization, it is still far from
clear whether China has established a currency mechanism that comports with GAiT
principles. In particular, there are legitimate concerns about the transparency of the new
inter-bank market and the extent to which China will continue to use currency measures
to hinder imports.
"I don't want to belong to any club that will accept me as a member."
- Groucho Marx'
I. INTRODUCTION
Among the few international organizations in which China cannot
claim membership is the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT),
the Geneva-based body in charge of global trade matters. China joined the
International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank in 1980,2 but it re-
mains an observer to GATT.3 During the seven-year Uruguay Round of
I JOHN BARTLETT, FAMILIAR QUOTATIONS 834 (1980).
2 See generally HAROLD K. JACOBSON & MICHEL OKSENBERG, CHINA'S PARTICIPATION IN THE IMF,
THE WORLD BANK, AND GATT 57-81 (1990) [hereinafter JACOBSON & OKSENBERG].
3 The Republic of China was one of the founding members of the original GATT charter on October
30, 1947, but Chiang Kai-shek's government withdrew from GATT in March of 1950, following Mao Tse-
dong's takeover of mainland China and the establishment of the People's Republic of China (PRC) on the
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Multilateral Trade Talks, which ended on December 15, 1993,4 Beijing
made a concerted effort to join GATT5 but did not succeed. Following the
Uruguay Round, China continues to pursue GATT membership, 6 and some
GATT members voice support, 7 but China remains on the outside. It re-
mains an open question what role China will play in the successor to GATT,
the World Trade Organization, 8 which is expected to be established in 1995.
mainland. For a chronology of China's relations with GATT, see Wenguo Cai, China's GATT
Membership: Selected Legal and Political Issues, 26 J. WORLD TRADE 35, 59 (Feb. 1992).
The PRC took steps to "rejoin" GATT in the early 1980s. Chinese officials began to take part in
GATT's commercial policy courses in Geneva in 1980, and in July of 1981, China became an observer at a
GATT meeting on renewal of the Multifibre Arrangement, which governs rules on textile trade. In
December 1983. China became a full member of the Multifibre Arrangement. GATT's legal advisor to the
director-general, Abe Linden, traveled to China in 1984, and China became a permanent observer to GATT
in December 1984. China officially applied to accede to GATT on July 14, 1986, at the start of the
Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Talks. See JACOBSON & OKSENBERG, supra note 2, at 83-92. See
also Thomas C.W. Chiu, China and GA 77: Implications of International Norms for China, 26 J. WORLD
TRADE 5 (Dec. 1992) (analyzing legal and political implications to China's GATT bid).
4 The Uruguay Round of multilateral trade talks began in Punta del Este. Uruguay, in November
1986. and ended in Geneva, Switzerland, on December 15, 1993. See generally Uruguay Round
Agreement is Reached; Clinton Notifies Congress Under Fast Track; Negotiators Clear Path to GA 7T Pact
by Sweeping Away Remaining Differences, 10 INT'L TRADE REP. (BNA) 2103 (Dec. 15. 1993) [hereinafter
Uruguay RoundAgreement is Reached].
5 To demonstrate Beijing's resolve to the GATT working party, China announced a number of re-
forms during the Uruguay Round. Although some of these announcements were cosmetic, as a whole they
reflected China's desire to show that it was making progress towards meeting GATT's concerns. See, e.g.,
China Approves Changes in Constitution, Government to Reflect Market Economy Shift, 10 INT'L TRADE
REP. (BNA) 549 (Mar. 31, 1993) [hereinafter China Approves Changes in Constitution] (China enacted
constitutional changes in 1993 under which the state's role in the economy was theoretically reduced.
China's constitution was revised to show that the state "strengthens economic legislation [and] improves
macroeconomic regulations." The earlier constitution stated that the government was responsible for
"overall balancing by economic planning."); Chinese Trade Official Outlines Proposed GAT-Compatible
Trade Reforms. 9 INT'L TRADE REP. (BNA) 387 (Mar. 4, 1992) (describing elimination of import licenses
for 16 product categories); China's Legislature Approves Membership in Two Copyright Protection
Conventions, 9 INT'L TRADE REP. (BNA) 1177 (July 8, 1992) (reporting China's decision to join the Beme
Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works and the World Copyright Convention); China
Announces Tariff Cuts on Over 3,000 Types of Commodities, 9 INT'L TRADE REP. (BNA) 2185 (Dec. 23,
1992).
6 Chinese officials have routinely called for China's re-entry to GATT since the close of the Uruguay
Round. See Foreign Trade Spokesman Stresses Urgency of China's Re-entry into GA7T, BBC Summary
of World Broadcasts, Jan. 2, 1994, available in LEXIS. News Library, AlIwId File; Chinese Official
Expects GA7T Accession By End of 1995, Promises More Tariff Cuts, 11 INT'L TRADE REP. (BNA) 171
(Feb. 2, 1994) [hereinafter Chinese Official Expects GA7TAccession].
7 See Working Party on China Reconvenes: US. Will Not Commit to Firm Timetable, 11 INT'L
TRADE REP. (BNA) 419 (Mar. 16, 1994).
8 The World Trade Organization is intended to replace GATT in January 1995. GATT set up a
committee to lay the groundwork for the WTO in March 1994. Among this committee's tasks is to decide
which countries that are currently in the process of applying to GATT (such as China) will be allowed into
the WTO. Delegates Set Up Committee to Study Establishment of WTO, I I INT'L TRADE REP. (BNA) 462
(Mar. 23, 1994) [hereinafter Delegates Set Up Committee].
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The fundamental difficulty for China has been trying to integrate its
largely non-market economy9 with the market-based principles of GATT.
With 116 member nations,10 GATT is based on the general principle that
trade levels can be increased (and trade wars avoided) through multilateral
tariff reductions"I and nondiscriminatory treatment among all members.12
In market economies, tariff cuts are presumed to have a direct effect on
prices, and thereby have an influence on the decisions of consumers and the
incentive structure of industry. In non-market economies such as China, the
effects of tariff cuts are more difficult to gauge.13 Not surprisingly, China's
negotiations with GATT have dealt with tariffs as only one issue among
several others.' 4 Additionally, GATT members (particularly the United
9 It is risky to label China's economy as "planned" given the increasing amount of private economic
activity, but clearly central planning continues to play an important role in China's political economy. See
generally CHINA: REFORM AND THE ROLE OF THE PLAN IN THE 1990s, World Bank Country Study (1992)
[hereinafter WORLD BANK COUNTRY STUDY]. In 1991, China began to characterize itself as a "socialist
market economy" rather than a "socialist commodity economy," but Chinese leaders did not define the
difference. China's claims to be a "market economy" were one of the issues that bogged down the GATT
talks. See James McGregor, China's Failure to Define Its Economy Stalls GAT 7Entry. Says U.S. Envoy,
ASIAN WALL ST. J., Mar. 8, 1993, at A4 [hereinafter China's Failure to Define its Economy].
10 There were 116 GATT members as of the close of the Uruguay Round on December 15, 1993.
Uruguay RoundAgreement is Reached, supra note 4, at 2103.
1 A nation's commitments under GATT can be roughly divided into tariff concessions and the
general Most-Favored-Nation provision. Article 11, Schedule of Concessions, explains the responsibilities
ofall GATT members as to tariff reductions. The operative language is the following: "Each contracting
party shall accord to the commerce of the other contracting parties treatment no less favorable than that
provided for [in the attached tariff reduction schedule.]" (Emphasis added). The GATT charter originally
contained a schedule oftariffcuts agreed to by all contracting parties. GATT CHARTER art. i, l(a).
Article I of GATT, General Most-Favoured-Nation Treatment, explains the general GATT principle
that members must not discriminate among members, whether in the form of tariffs or other means:
With respect to customs duties and charges of any kind imposed on or in connection
with importation or exportation or imposed on the international transfer of payments for
imports .or exports, and with respect to the method of levying formalities in connection
with importation and exportation, . . . any advantage, favour, privilege or immunity
granted by any contracting party to any product originating in or destined for any other
country shall be accorded immediately and unconditionally to the like product
originating in or destined for the territories of all other contracting parties.
GATT CHARTER art. I, I. Although in modem times GATT has provided a forum to discuss trade
disputes and to monitor adverse trade practices, the initial purpose of the organization was to bring about
multilateral tariff reductions in the post-World War II reconstruction era. See U.S. DEP'T OF STATE,
COMMERCIAL POLICY SERIES, PUB. NO. 2983, ANALYSIS OF GENERAL AGREEMENT ON TARIFFS AND
TRADE 109 (Nov. 1947).
12 See GATT CHARTER art. 1, 1.
13 JACOBSON & OKSENBERG, supra note 2, at 89.
14 China's initial bargaining position was that reducing tariffs alone would be the best way to in-
crease imports. In 1986, China had considerable leeway to cut import tariffs, which averaged 44%.
JACOBSON & OKSENBERG, supra note 2, at 90 & n.12.
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States, the European Community members, and Japan) have focused on
China's non-tariff barriers to trade, such as state planning, subsidies, price
controls, and state-run industry.15 The difference between the Chinese
delegation and the GATT members could be summed up as follows: for
GATT, the question is how to absorb China without diluting its commit-
ment to market-based trade.16 For China, the issue is how to join GATT
without giving up the necessity of state ownership and some degree of
centralized planning.17
This Comment focuses on one of the key obstacles for China in its
bid to join GATT: China's dual-rate currency regime. Normally, currency
issues command little attention within GATT, but China's bid during the
Uruguay Round presented a unique situation because China's restrictions on
foreign exchange had long been a vital element in its trade reforms.'8
Ironically, China's oft-criticized exchange rate regime was one of the key
reasons for its foreign trade success. The Uruguay Round provided a
unique opportunity in that it directed international scrutiny towards China's
currency mechanism and ultimately encouraged China to overhaul this
mechanism as a precondition for GATT entry.
Part II of this Comment presents an overview of China's dual-rate
currency mechanism from the early 1980s up to the end of 1993, and the
main criticisms of this system by China's trading partners, especially the
15 In the first four years of the Uruguay Round. talks between the GATT working group and China
focused on gathering information on China's trade and economic reforms. See generally GA7T Rejects
New Chinese Membership Bid Requests More Data on Trade Liberalization, 7 INT'L TRADE REP. (BNA)
1477 (Sept. 26, 1990) [hereinafter GATT Rejects]. The amount of information requested was staggering:
By mid-1988, GATT members had put forth over 1,200 questions regarding China's economic structure, a
record number. JACOBSON & OKSENBERG, supra note 2, at 96.
16 China's deemed importance as an upcoming trading power is often cited as justification for in-
cluding China within GATT. JACOBSON & OKSENBERG, supra note 2. at 88-9. But it has also been noted
that China generally needs GATT more than GATT' needs China, as demonstrated by China's efforts to
change its domestic policies to conform with GATT principles. Chiu, supra note 3, at 8-10.
17 Former Chinese leader Zhao Ziyang told a visiting GATT delegation in 1986, that he believed
China's planned commodity economy, the intended outcome of China's reforms, would accord with
GATT's market-oriented principles and be sufficient for China's entry. JACOBSON & OKSENBERG, supra
note 2, at 92. China's economy has changed significantly since 1986, but Chinese leaders have continued
to uphold the need for an active state role in economic activity, despite GATT's focus on market economic
principles. For example, China altered its constitution in 1993, but the change was minor. Under the new
constitution, the government oversees "state-owned enterprise," rather than "state-run enterprise" as it did
prior to the 1993 revision. See China Approves Changes in Constitution, supra note 5, at 549. China
claimed to be a "market economy" near the close of the GATT talks, but this contention was itself a
stumbling block between China and GATT. See China's Failure to Define its Economy, supra note 9, at
A4.
18 See generally NICHOLAS R. LARDY, FOREIGN TRADE AND ECONOMIC REFORM IN CHINA: 1978-
1990 24-29. 51-81 (1992) (providing an in-depth analysis of China's trade and currency policies).
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U.S. Part III examines how the GATT charter and the Articles of
Agreement of the IMF handle exchange rate issues, and why the GATT-
IMF legal framework is not capable of policing exchange rate systems that
are used to further trade goals. Finally, Part IV examines China's January
1994, currency reforms, and considers whether they will facilitate China's
entry to GATT. If China is eventually admitted to GATT, a related issue
considered herein is what conditions could be attached to China's protocol
of accession in order to shield international trade from adverse currency
measures.
II. CHINA'S CURRENCY PRACTICES
A. Overview: The Difference Between Import Controls v. Currency
Restrictions
Imagine a developing nation that wants to restrict the import of sports
cars. It might choose between two general routes. First, it could enact a
heavy import tariff, quota, or even an outright ban to make it more costly to
import foreign cars and more favorable to buy locally-built cars. This
would be a trade measure used to restrict imports. Or, to achieve the same
ends, the nation's central bank could simply refuse to allocate hard currency
for the purchase of imported cars. 19 The second choice is actually a mone-
tary restriction that in effect restricts imports. Roughly speaking, it is the
latter choice that has been used in China in the mid-1980s20 and early
1990s.21 China has shown that managing access to foreign currency is an
effective way to restrict unwanted imports.
22
Historically, China has been able to restrict trade flows through cur-
rency measures because it has enforced various degrees of control23 on the
19 This analogy is commonly used to point out the link between currency measures and trade. See
Frieder Roessler, The Relationship Between the World Trade Order and the International Monetary
System, in 5 THE NEW GATT ROUND OF MULTILATERAL TRADE NEGOTIATIONS: LEGAL AND ECONOMIC
PROBLEMS 363, 375-76 (Emst-Ulrich Petersmann & Menihard Hilf eds., 1988) [hereinafter The
Relationship].
20 LARDY, supra note 18, at 59.
21 James McGregor, China Removes Controls on Currency Exchanges ASIAN WALL ST. J. WKLY.,
June 26, 1993, at 26 [hereinafter China Removes Controls].
22 See generally LARDY, supra note 18, at 59; China Removes Controls. supra note 2 1. at 26.
23 China had very strict, centralized control over foreign exchange from 1950 to 1979. LARDY,
supra note 18, at 27, 51. In 1979, the central government took the first steps to relinquish its monopoly on
the retention of foreign currency, but the govemment continued to exercise control over access to hard cur-
rency bank accounts. Id at 52.
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conversion of its currency unit, the yuan,24 into other hard currencies.
Throughout the world, foreign trade generally is conducted with the U.S.
dollar, the Japanese yen, or the German mark, along with a few other
convertible currencies. Many newly industrialized nations such as South
Korea,25 Taiwan,26 and Thailand27 have liberalized their currency regula-
tions to allow for convertibility, subject to various restrictions on account
holding and repatriation of funds. Unlike these newly-industrialized coun-
tries, which often have large monetary reserves and relatively stable
inflation,28 developing nations like China, India, and the Philippines
generally face a more volatile economic situation in terms of monetary
reserves,29 inflation,30 and unemployment.31 Thus, these nations tend to
enforce very strict rules on the use of foreign exchange. Typically, a devel-
24 China's currency is the renminbi ("the people's money"), measured in units called yuan.
25 South Korea places restrictions on the amount of foreign currency that domestic firms, trading
companies, institutional investors, and insurance companies can hold in bank deposits. Residents can have
domestic foreign currency accounts, but individuals are not permitted to have'offshore foreign currency
accounts. Restrictions also apply to the amount of foreign currency that South Korean travelers can take
out of the country. See FINANCING FOREIGN OPERATIONS, SOUTH KOREA 6-10 (Economist Intelligence
Unit, May 1993).
26 Taiwan removed most of its foreign exchange regulations in mid-1987. All trade-related foreign
exchange transactions are unrestricted, but the central bank restricts the amount that residents can remit in
or out of Taiwan for those remittances that involve a conversion into or out of New Taiwan dollars. See
FINANCING FOREIGN OPERATIONS, TAIWAN 10 (Economist Intelligence Unit, Nov. 1993).
27 Thailand passed liberalizing regulations for foreign exchange in May 1990, April 1991, and May
1992. Thailand now allows commercial banks, rather than the central bank, to administer regulations on
currency flows, repatriation of funds, and accounts. See generally FINANCING FOREIGN OPERATIONS,
THAILAND 9-12 (Economist Intelligence Unit, May 1993).
28 Nation International Reserves (billion USS) Consumer Price Change (% chanee 8/93-8/94)
Taiwan $87.26 (Apr. 94) +3.4
Singapore $50.67 (Mar. 94) +3.2
South Korea $20.98 (Apr. 94) +6.0
Thailand $26.55 (May 94) +5.4
Source: Prices & Trends, FAR EASTERN ECON. REV., Aug. 11. 1994, at 72-73.
29 Nation International Reserves (billion US$) Consumer Price Change (% change 8/93-8/94
China $29.83 (Mar. 94) +21.3
India $15.83 (May 94) +6.1
Philippines $6.03 (Apr. 94) +9.9
Source: Prices & Trends, FAR EASTERN ECON. REV., Aug. 11, 1994, at 72-73.
30 Id.
31 See, e.g., Unemployment Situation "Extremely Difficult; " Registrations System to be Set Up, BBC
Summary of World Broadcasts, Apr. 8. 1994, available in LEXIS, News Library, Allwid File (quoting re-
port in New China News Agency reporting that China had 130 million surplus rural laborers and 4.1
million jobless urban workers in early 1994); Joel Haveman & Norman Kempster. The Case of the
Disappearing Worker: What's Gone Wrong? L.A. TIMES. July 6. 1993, World Rep. at I (estimating
India's unemployment rate at greater than 15%); Philippines January Unemployment 8.6%. Reuters, Mar.
29, 1994, available in LEXIS, News Library, Allwid File (reporting the Philippines unemployment rate in
January 1994 of 8.6%, or 2.32 million workers, and underemployment of 5.7 million workers out of a total
workforce of 26.97 workers).
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oping nation will require people seeking to convert local money into hard
currency to state why they need the hard currency. In this way, the state can
turn down people who want to "raid" the state bank account in order to pay
for imported goods that are not deemed necessary by the state.
China's policy of controlling trade flows through currency measures
has raised difficult questions for trade policy makers, especially in the U.S.
As China has liberalized its trade sector and pursued a place within
GATT,32 the U.S. has benefited by. increasing its exports to China.
33
However, China's phenomenal trade growth,34 its trade deficits with the
U.S., 35 and its bid to join GATT have excited a renewed interest in the link
between currency controls and free trade principles. The U.S. Department
of the Treasury has led this charge, citing China for manipulating its cur-
rency in three consecutive semi-annual reports to Congress.36  The U.S.
Commerce Department and its International Trade Commission has also
scrutinized the effects of China's currency controls in dumping disputes.
37
32 See supra note 5.
33 U.S. exports to China were forecast to reach US$ 8.2 billion in 1993, an increase of 10.6% over
1992. Imports from China were expected to reach US$ 29.5 billion, up 14.6%. Search of National Trade
Databank, U.S. Foreign Trade Update-Monthly, Int'l Trade Admin., year-end 1993.
34 China's merchandise exports stood at US$ 25.7 billion in 1986, the start of the Uruguay Round,
and had more than doubled to US$ 51.5 billion by the end of 1990. From 1991 to 1993, merchandise
exports continued to increase. At the end of 1991, exports were US$ 58.9 billion, and had grown to US$
69.6 billion by the end of 1992. 1993 IMF INT'L FIN. STAT. Y.B. 281. By the end of 1993, they were
forecast to reach US$ 72.8 billion. CHINA COUNTRY REPORT 9 (Economist Intelligence Unit, 4th Qtr.
1993).
35 The U.S. forecast a US$ 21.3 billion trade deficit with China in 1993. National Trade Data Bank.
U.S. Foreign Trade Update-Monthly, Int'l Trade Admin., year-end 1993.
36 § 3004 and § 3005 of the Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988, requires the U.S.
Treasury to present to Congress semi-annual reports on international monetary and exchange rate policy.
See DEPARTMENT OF TREASURY, REP. TO CONGRESS ON INT'L ECONOMIC AND EXCHANGE RATE POL'Y I
(Nov. 1993) [hereinafter Nov. 1993 TREASURY REP.].
In the November 1993 report, Treasury for the third consecutive time concluded that China was ma-
nipulating its currency within the meaning of § 3004, and thereby gained an unfair competitive advantage.
Id. at 26. Treasury first leveled this charge of exchange rate manipulation in its December, 1992 report.
DEPARTMENT OF TREASURY, REP. TO CONGRESS ON INT'L ECONOMIC AND EXCHANGE RATE POL'Y 34
(Dec. 1992) [hereinafter DEC. 1992 TREASURY REP.]. Treasury made the same charge in its May 1993 re-
port. DEPARTMENT OF TREASURY, REP. TO CONGRESS ON INT'L ECONOMIC AND EXCHANGE RATE POL'Y
26 (May 1993).
37 In 1988, the International Trade Administration investigated complaints that caps, hats, and visors
from China were being dumped in the U.S. at less than fair market value. Among the ITA's conclusions
was that China was a "state-controlled economy" within the meaning of § 773(a) of the Tariff Act of 1930.
The ITA based this conclusion in part upon Chinese government control over currency quota allocation,
foreign exchange earning targets, and limited convertibility of the currency. Final Determination of Sales
at Less Than Fair Value; Certain Headwear From the People's Republic of China, 54 Fed. Reg. 11983,
11985 (Int'l Trade Admin. 1989).
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In addition, China's currency regime has become a hot topic within
GATT. Since 1986, when China first put forth its bid to re-join the organi-
zation, the GATT working party assigned to China's application has
discussed a range of China's economic reforms. As an applicant, China was
required to submit detailed reports on its economic and trade structure, and
answer questions from the working party.38 Initially, the talks dealt with
issues such as price reform, state subsidies, the publication of rules, and
import licensing.39  In the last three years, however, currency controls
became a focus of China's GATT talks.40 So central had the monetary issue
become by the end of the Uruguay Round that China finally agreed with the
working party that currency reform would be necessary to join GATT.41
How the parties came to hold this viewpoint presents an interesting study of
global trade law and diplomacy.
B. China's Currency Situation Prior to the mid-1980s
Up to about the mid-1980s, China's currency unit, the yuan, was
sheltered from the outside world. Most of the country's economy had no
access to foreign currency and operated exclusively by using the yuan.
Trade was centralized in about 15 state-run trading enterprises, 42 and
China's main exports were limited to commodities and a few light industrial
goods. 43 China's trade structure was only just beginning to resemble that of
Taiwan and Hong Kong, with their emphasis on exports of industrial and
manufactured goods.
44
38 See JACOBSON & OKSENBERG, supra note 2. at 96.
39 The working party first met to discuss China's bid on February 23, 1988. Press reports indicate
that the group focused on a range of issues, including quotas, subsidies, state trading organizations, and
transparency in trade negotiations. GATT Working Group on P.R.C. Membership Bid Meets, But Decision
Expected to Take Years 5, INT'L TRADE REP. (BNA) 253 (Feb. 24, 1988) [hereinafter GATT Working
Group].
40 See Talks on China's GATT Membership End; Questions Raised on Currency Proposal 10 INT'L
TRADE REP. (BNA) 490 (Mar. 24, 1993) [hereinafter Talks on China's GATTMembership End].
41 See New Foreign Exchange Rate Good for China's GAYT Re-entry, Xinhua General Overseas
News Service, Dec. 29,.1993, available in LEXIS, News Library, AlIwid File [hereinafter New Foreign
Exchage Rate].
4 See WORLD BANK COUNTRY STUDY, supra note 9, at 48.
43 From 1980 to 1985, China's main export category was mineral-based fuels, food products, and
non-food products such as oil seeds, textile fibers, and animal and vegetable raw materials. Manufactured
goods were skewed towards textiles and fabrics. Export of metal-based manufactured products and ma-
chineywere stagnant. See WORLD BANK COUNTRY STUDY, supra note 9, at 204.
From 1982 to 1992, over 92% of Taiwan's annual exports have been industrial goods. During
this period, Taiwan's overall exports grew from US$22.20 billion to US$81.47 billion. DIRECTORATE-
GENERAL OF BUDGET, ACCOUNTING AND STATISTICS, 1993 STAT. Y.B. REPUBLIC OF CHINA 248.
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In the 1980s, China began to open its trade sector to the global econ-
omy,45 but several decades of economic isolation meant that China faced
considerable monetary risks. In the 1950s and 1960s, Beijing had followed
a policy of strict import substitution, where the goal of foreign trade had
been to achieve self sufficiency.46 Imports were heavily skewed towards
production equipment,47 while exports were viewed as wasteful. One result
of this focus on self-sufficiency was that the exchange rate of the yuan was
overvalued 48 and many strategic imports (such as steel, machinery, and
equipment) were subsidized out of the state's foreign currency reserves.
49
Thus, China's central bank, the People's Bank of China (PBC), had total
control over foreign exchange in China. It would allocate hard currency to
import certain necessary machinery, and this machinery would in turn be
sold at artificially low yuan-denominated prices to domestic factories. In
effect, the Bank of China would absorb a currency loss on these transac-
tions.50 Starting in 1964, China lessened such currency losses by setting up
a separate, devalued rate of the yuan which was used to price certain im-
ports.51 This raised some prices on imported goods closer to their world
prices, and helped to stem the central bank's losses on imports.
China's overvalued currency produced more intractable losses on
exports. In the 1950s and 1960s, China experienced the same problem
From 1980 to 1990, Hong Kong's principal export categories were apparel and clothing accessories,
watches and clocks, electrical machinery, textiles, electronic components, and jewelry. These six
categories accounted for about 60% of total domestic exports. HONG KONG CENSUS AND STATISTICS
DEPARTMENT, HONG KONG SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC TRENDS: 1980-1990 at46 (1991).
45 China began to promote export processing in 1979. Imported components and raw materials were
ear-marked for export producing firms, and the state began to ensure that these firms received a steady
supply of domestic inputs such as electricity, fuel, and raw materials. Two other key steps in export devel-
opment were the passage of the joint-venture law in 1979, and the establishment of the first special
economic zones on the southeast coast of China in 1980. See LARDY, supra note 18, at 41-42.
46 Id at 16.
47 In the 1950s, some 90% of China's imports were-producer goods. This percentage would later
drop in the 1960s as China began to import more grain, but overall China's import substitution policies en-
sured a bias against the import of consumer goods. Id at 29-32.
48 The People's Bank of China apparently believed that a devaluation was tantamount to a loss of
national prestige. Id at 23.
49 Id at21.
50 Id at 22-23.
51 In 1964, China began converting the import cost to domestic cost by using a premium rate for the
yuan. The premium started at 103% in 1964, decreased to 60% in 1975, and increased to 80% from 1977
to 1980. This policy effectively devalued the yuan, and as a result prices on about one fifth of China's im-
ports effectively doubled. The beneficiaries of this devaluation were China's producer goods sector,
particularly makers of machinery and other equipment, who could price their goods beneath competing
imports. Id. at 22-23.
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faced by many centrally planned economies, which was that its overvalued
exchange rate ensured that most exports resulted in currency losses. For
example, when one of China's state-run trading enterprises bought textiles
from a domestic producer and then exported them, the overvalued exchange
rate ensured that when the trading company converted its dollar earnings
back into yuan, the amount it received would often be less than the original
amount it paid to acquire the textiles.52 In a market economy, where deci-
sions are based on prices, and prices reflect the actual value of goods, such
losses would normally not be allowed to continue. However, in a centrally-
planned economy like China, relative costs did not affect production deci-
sions. As a result, exports of surplus goods would continue even as
currency losses mounted. The best that China's trade planners could hope
for was to offset export losses with customs revenues and with export
profits from China's more competitive products, such as agricultural
goods.5 3 Even so, China's exports continued to create losses up to the
1980s.
54
From the mid- 1960s to the early- 1980s, Chinese planners found that
the most efficient way to balance its collection of loss-making and profit-
making enterprises was through a complex system of.exchange rate meas-
ures. For example, the 1964 pricing reform mentioned above effectively set
up a dual-rate currency: For about 80% of import transactions,55 the official
rate used to convert yuan to dollars was 2.46 (i.e., an enterprise had to pay
only 2.46 yuan for every dollar it needed), but for certain imports 56 the rate
was a more realistic 5 yuan per dollar. Companies that bought imported
goods at the latter rate would have to pay more yuan - about twice as
much as those companies that used the former rate. Using a dual rate sys-
tem allowed state planners to subsidize certain sectors, such as the
military, 57 by allowing them to pay for imports at an artificially overvalued
yuan rate.
52 ld. at 25.
53 Id. at 25, 3 1-32.
54 Id. at 25.
55 Id. at 22.
56 Whole plant imports, machinery, and electronic equipment were the main products priced on this
basis starting in 1964. Id at 22.
57 For example, factories run by China's military did not have to buy their imports at the devalued
renminbi rate (5 per dollar). Preferential treatment for the military would later become embedded in
China's foreign exchange retention system in the 1980s, allowing military-run enterprises to retain 100%
of their hard currency earnings. Id. at 23, 55.
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C. The Deng Reforms
Under Deng Xiao-ping's leadership, China began to reform its trade
and economic policies from 1979, to the early 1980s. In 1979, China estab-
lished the special economic zones and a joint venture law, and began to shift
its trade policy towards export promotion.
58 At the same time, China began
to grant more autonomy to trading enterprises.
59 The government scrapped
the old system of centralized trading houses.
60 By the mid-1980s, China
had several hundred foreign trade companies in operation, and the number
reached 1,500 by 1987, and topped 5,000 by 1990.61
Perhaps the most critical part of China's trade reforms was the revi-
sion of the exchange rate .structure. Clearly, Beijing needed a more
accessible system of foreign exchange administration in order to encourage
exports and foreign investment. Thus, starting in 1979, China began to
allow certain enterprises to retain a fraction of their foreign exchange
earnings62 instead of exchanging them back into yuan. The actual amount
retained varied depending on the products and industry involved, but in
general the retention rate was 15-30%.63
In 1985, China expanded this system of foreign exchange retention
by opening the first foreign exchange adjustment center (hereinafter called a
swap center) in Shenzhen.M The swap center offered a kind of crude cur-
rency market where selected trading enterprises could either exchange their
retained hard currency for yuan, or sell yuan for hard currency.
65
58 Gradual reforms to decentralize China's trading system continued in the first half of the 1980s,
backed by China's Ministry of Foreign Economic Relations and Trade. MOFERT put forth a five-part
trade reform agenda to the State Council in 1984, and the State Council officially sanctioned the reform
program on September 15, 1984. See generally CHINA: EXTERNAL TRADE AND CAPITAL. WORLD BANK
COUNTRY STUDY 1988 at 21 [hereinafter CHINA: EXTERNAL TRADE AND CAPITAL].
59 LARDY, supra note 18, at 39.
60 Id.
61 WORLD BANK COUNTRY STUDY, supra note 9, at 48.
62 The funds retained were actually held by the Bank of China, and thus could be characterized as an
entitlement to use foreign exchange, subject to government oversight. LARDY, supra note 18. at 52.
63 The retention rate was most generous (30% of all earnings) for assembly operations that used
imported parts. Most enterprises that sold commodities could only retain a fraction (20-40%) of their
earnin above the level they recorded in 1978. Id at 52-3.
See Diane Yowell, Swap Center System to Expand, CHINA BUS. REV., Sept.-Oct. 1988, at 10.
65 Exchanges at the swap centers were governed by complex rules governing the amount that could
be traded, the required purpose for the trade, the frequency of exchanges allowed. For an informative
background on the early swap center regulations, see generally Hiram E. Chodosh, Swap Centers in the
People's Republic of China: A Step Toward Partial Convertibility of Local Currency, 25 INT'L LAWYER
415 (1991).
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Expanding the retention system 66 and allowing limited convertibility
marked a key shift in China's ideological stance: no longer would the
People's Bank of China act as the sole manager of foreign exchange. China
had decided toadjust its incentive structure by allowing companies to man-
age a share of their own profits.
After the Shenzhen opening, the swap center system expanded
quickly. By 1989, there were about 80 swap centers throughout China.67
The swap centers became the principal means by which foreign-invested
enterprises operated their affairs. They relied on these centers to acquire
yuan in order to pay local costs, and to exchange their domestic earnings
into dollars for repatriation. Also, all companies needed hard currency to
pay for imported goods, particularly components. Thus, the swap centers
provided a workable source of hard currency to fund imports. By 1993, the
swap centers handled about 80% of all current account transactions within
China.68
The opening of swap centers effectively cemented a dual currency
regime within China. The Bank of China handled two exchange rates.
First, it set an official rate for the yuan, which was used by tourists69 and for
priority imports under the state plan.70 Second, the bank allowed the swap
center administrators to peg a daily swap center rate, which was allowed to
float within a limited range. This rate was allowed to depreciate relative to
the official rate,71 and thus accurately reflected supply and demand. The
official rate remained highly overvalued. For example, in 1988, one U.S.
dollar bought only 3.7 yuan at the official rate, while at the swap centers
66 In the early years of the swap centers, companies in most provinces were allowed to retain 25% of
their earnings in the form of foreign exchange entitlements. Enterprises in Xinjiang province could keep
50%. The retention rates in the Special Economic Zones (i.e., Shenzhen) and Tibet were 100%, while
Guangdong and Fujian provinces retained 30%. Priority industries, such as tourism and electronics, were
allowed to keep 30-50% or more. Yowell, supra note 64, at 11.
The retention rates would later become more uniform. By 1993, all trading enterprises had to
surrender 20% of their foreign exchange earnings to the central bank in exchange for yuan offered at the
official rate. The central bank had an option to buy another 30% of the firm's foreign exchange earnings at
the swap center rate. As for the remaining 50% of the firm's export earnings, 40% would accrue to the ex-
porter's hard currency credit account, while 10% would accrue to the local government. See NOv. 1993
TREASURY REP., supra note 36, at 23.
67 LARDY. supra note 18, at 61.
68 China Unifies Exchange Rates. FIN. TIMES (London), Dec. 30, 1993, at I1, available in LEXIS,
News Library, Allwld File.
69 The official rate was the rate at which tourists had to exchange their hard currency for Foreign
Exchange Certificates, the special currency that foreigners had to use while in China. China Removes
Controls, supra note 21, at 26.
70 NOv. 1993 TREASURY REP., supra note 36, at 23.
71 LARDY, supra note 18, at 62.
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one dollar bought 6 yuan.72 In terms of yuan received per one dollar ex-
changed, this premium of the swap market rate over the official rate stayed
at about 67% in 1988. 73 The difference between the two rates then
narrowed to about 35% in late 1989,74 and narrowed further to less than
10%75 at the end of 1990. The two rates remained close to each other
(roughly 5-10%) up to the beginning of 1992.76 After 1992, the swap center
rate then diverged again from the official rate. Thus, in October of 1992,
the swap center rate averaged 6.91 yuan per dollar, but the official rate was
only 5.55 yuan per dollar, a gap of about 25%.77 The gap increased to about
45% by February of 1993,78 and later peaked at over 80% in June79 before
settling back down to about 50% by the end of 1993.80
By using two rates, China realized several trade benefits:
1. Subsidies to Certain Sectors
As noted above, China could protect certain industries by allowing
them to pay for imported commodities at the overvalued official rate. The
main beneficiaries were certain state-run enterprises and the military, who
in effect were allowed to pay much less than the actual price for imported
goods.81 The central bank absorbed-a currency loss on these transactions.
72 Id at 65.
73 Id
74 In late 1989, the official rate was devalued to 4.2 yuan per dollar while the swap market rate was
about 5.7 yuan. Id The figure of 35% is extrapolated from Lardy's data: In late 1989, for every dollar
paid in, a person would receive roughly 35% more yuan in return if he exchanged his dollar at the swap
center rate compared to the official rate.
75 In late 1990, the official rate was devalued from 4.2 yuan per dollar to 5.2 yuan per dollar.
Shortly thereafter the swap market rate in Shanghai stood at only 5.3 yuan per dollar. In other cities the
swap market rate ranged from 5.5 to 5.7 yuan per dollar. Id at 65.
76 Exact data on the swap center rates are difficult to locate, but Peter Harrold and Rajiv Lall of the
World Bank have published a graphic based on IMF data that shows the swap center rate holding at under
6 yuan per dollar from the end of 1990, up to the beginning of 1992. (Unfortunately, the graphic does not
state exact figures for the two rates). During this time, the official rate was 5.2 to 5.7, according to official
Chinese statistics. See 1993 IMP INT'L FIN. STAT. Y.B. 279. Thus, the difference between the two rates
did not vary much more than about 5-10%. See Peter Harrold & Rajiv Lall, China: Reform and
Development in 1992-93,215 WORLD BANK DISCUSSION PAPERS 15 (1993).
77 DEC. 1992 TREASURY REP., supra note 36, at 32.
78 Harrold & Lall, supra note 76, at 16.
79 On June 1, 1993, China lifted restraints on the swap center rate and the yuan immediately depre-
ciated to about 10.5 yuan per dollar. The official rate was about 5.77 per dollar. Thus, the premium of
yuan received for each dollar was about 81%. See Nov. 1993 TREASURY REP., supra note 36, at 25.
80 The gap between the swap center rate and the official rate was 51% on November 10, 1993. Id
81 The subsidy amounted to the difference between the swap center rate and the official rate. Thus,
in 1988, importers enjoying the subsidy would only have to pay about 3.72 yuan for every one dollar worth
of imports they purchased. This was a large savings over the market rate of 6 yuan per dollars worth of
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Allowing some enterprises to use the official rate for imports shielded
these enterprises from world prices, and thus helped to prop up many of
China's more inefficient producers. Chinese policy makers needed this so-
called "air-lock" 82 to protect the domestic economy from effects of sudden
price competition. The alternative choice was to allow a steep devaluation
of the yuan, which would have forced all Chinese enterprises to pay market
rates for their imports and would have sparked inflation, a step China was
unwilling to take.
2. Taxes on Foreign Exchange Transactions
The dual rate system also enabled China to levy a hidden tax on cur-
rency trades. For example, in 1988, the Bank of China had to pay only 3.72
yuan (not the swap center rate of about 6 yuan)83 for each I U.S. dollar it
purchased, a savings of about 38%. Thus, the bank could add to its foreign
exchange reserves by forcing trading enterprises to "sell" part of their hard
currency earnings at the official rate rather than the swap center rate. In
particular, the People's Bank of China could target foreigners by forcing
them to register their incoming capital at the official rate and repatriate
profits at the swap market rate. 84 Tourists also had to use the official rate to
buy local currency.8 5
Though the tax on currency exchanges could be harsh on foreign-
invested enterprises, ultimately it extended to all exporters. By 1993, China
had reformed its retention rate structure and required almost all trading en-
terprises to surrender 20% of their foreign currency earnings at the official
rate, while the government had an option to buy 30% of the earnings at the
swap center rate.8 6 The trading enterprises could keep the remaining 50%
in a foreign exchange credit account. In effect, 80% of the trading enter-
imports. The effect of this subsidy was considerable. In 1988, it was estimated to be worth about 93
billion yan, or about 7 % of China's 1988 GNP. LARDY, supra note 18, at 121.
82"Air-lock" is the term used by economists to describe the almost total shield of protectionism
existing between China's economy and the world economy prior to the late-1970s and 1980s. Remnants of
the "air-lock" policies persisted through the 1980s, and to the present. See CHINA: EXTERNAL TRADE AND
CAPITAL, supra note 58, at 25-26.
83 LARDY, supra note 18, at 65.
84 Pamela Baldinger & Anne Stevenson-Yang, New Reforms and Taxes for '94; Trends and Issues,
CHINA Bus. RE V., Jan. 1994, at4.
85 See Amy E. Yates, Note, The Role of the Black Market in China's International Financial System,
7 J. INT'L L. Bus. 833, 838 (1986).
86 Nov. 1993 TREASURY REP., supra note 36, at 23.
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prise's trade revenue would be either held in a foreign currency account or
converted to yuan at an approximate market rate (the swap center rate),
while the Bank of China realized a hidden exchange tax on the 20% portion
that it forced the trading enterprise to exchange at the official rate.
87
D. International Response to China's Currency Practices
China submitted its application to join GATT in July 1986, and in
March 1987, the GATT set up a working party to handle China's bid.8
8
From the beginning, no one expected China's accession to move quickly.89
In 1985, China had launched its reform program for urban areas, which in-
cluded the introduction of two-tiered pricing and the decentralization of
enterprise management. 90 Once the talks with GATT began, information
about the extent of Beijing's reforms was hard to come by, and fact finding
proved to be a slow process. 91
It is difficult to discuss details of China's GATT bid because the
working party's negotiations were private. Press reports and comments by
the parties involved, particularly the U.S., give only an indication of the
GATT talks. It is clear, however, that prior to the Tiananmen incident, the
working party focused mostly on broad reform issues such as China's state
sector, subsidies, and the transparency of regulations. 92 The problem of
currency controls apparently did not receive much attention until the last
two years of the Uruguay Round.93 The main criticisms, coming both from
within the working party and from U.S. policy makers, are described below:
87 This was a significant amount of revenue, given that China's 100 or so swap centers were han-
dling about 80% of all current account transactions in 1993. See China Unifies Exchange Rates, supra note
68,at 11.
88 See generally supra note 3.
89 See GA 7T Rejects, supra note 15, at 1477.
90 The Third Plenary Session of the 12th Central Committee of the Communist Party adopted the
"Decision on Reform of the Economic Structures" on October 20, 1984. This was the seminal document
upon which China's reform program was introduced in urban areas starting in 1985. See WORLD BANK
COUNTRY STUDY. supra note 9, at 42-43.
91 China's responses to questions from working party members were apparently vague and often
conflicted with information provided by foreign companies operating in China. See GA7T Rejects, supra
note 15, at 1477.
92 See GA7T Working Group, supra note 39, at 253.
93 It was in 1992, and 1993, that the swap center rate of the yuan and the official rate began to di-
verge. Supra notes 77-80. Press reports indicate that China answered questions on its foreign exchange
allocation system in March and October 1993. See, eg., Talks on China's GA 7T Membership End supra
note 40, at 490; Specific Problems Facing China for GA7T Re-entry Are Outlined, 10 INT'L TRADE REP.
(BNA) 1690 (Oct. 6, 1993).
PACIFIC RIM LAW & POLICY JOURNAL
1. Foreign Investors Lose Out
Foreign investors were among the loudest critics of China's swap
center system. Initially, the swap centers helped to solve a serious liquidity
problem by providing a mechanism through which investors could repatri-
ate their yuan profits. This was particularly important for those investors
who were manufacturing goods in China to sell to Chinese consumers.
Most of their earnings were in local currency and they had little or no
foreign currency earnings to help pay for needed imports, and thus no way
to acquire hard currency for repatriation. 94
The big problem, however, was that the swap centers would literally
run out of hard currency in times of heavy demand. 95 This created enor-
mous tension for China's monetary authorities. If the People's Bank of
China tried to limit the outflow of hard currency by restricting activity at the
swap centers, black market money traders would simply take over a larger
part of the currency market, and the result would be a sharp devaluation of
the black market yuan rate. This is exactly what happened in mid-1993.96
By June of 1993, increasing restrictions on swap center trades led to a
general shortage of U.S. dollars, which pushed the black market rate to
above 10 yuan per U.S. dollar. At the same time, the swap center rate was
40% overvalued at 8.135 yuan to the dollar, and the official rate was a
totally unrealistic 5.7 per dollar.97 Unable to compete with the black
marketers, and facing a shortage of U.S. dollars, the swap centers severely
restricted exchanges. 98 This left the foreign-invested companies in a bind.
They were legally prohibited from trading money on the black market, but
there was nowhere else to acquire hard currency.99 Moreover, the extent of
this problem was not short-term; a shortage of hard currency had been
94 China Removes Controls, supra note 21, at 26.
95 Increased demand is evidenced by the increased turnover at the swap centers. In 1992. the swap
centers handled US$ 26 billion worth of transactions, a fourfold increase over the US$ 6.2 billion in ex-
changes handled in 1988. China Removes Controls, supra note 21, at 26.
96 See id.
97 Robert Steiner, China Currency Fall Stalls Rally in Colony's Market, ASIAN WALL ST. J. WKLY.,
June 7, 1993, at 28.
98 See China Removes Controls, supra note 21, at 26.
99 Id Many foreign companies did turn to the black market to stay in business. "Finding dollars
became so competitive that foreign companies started dispatching local employees with checkbooks and
portable phones to cities across China in search of any black-market currency deals they could find." Id
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building for about five months. 100 Trading companies, including most
foreign-invested companies, had difficulties getting hard currency from the
swap centers because administrators were routinely rejecting applications
for yuan-to-U.S.$ exchanges. 101
In June of 1993, the government finally caved in and devalued the
swap center rate to over 10 yuan per dollar, allowing it to approach the
black market rate.102 While this move allowed the swap centers to open
again, it was a hollow victory. China's policy of trying to close the gap
between the official rate and the swap center rate had spun out of control
and the gap had actually widened. In effect, China's black market had
momentarily wrested control away from the center, and forced a devaluation
of the swap center rate. In the process, foreign investors learned that the
swap centers could not always be counted on.
2. Pressure from Foreign Governments
Foreign governments, particularly the U.S., were another critic of
China's currency system. As mentioned above, the U.S. Department of
Treasury first cited China for "manipulating" its currency in November
1992, and continued to make this claim throughout 1993.103 The U.S. was
concerned because its 1992 trade deficit with China was $18.3 billion, and
the 1993 deficit was expected to increase 26% to $23.1 billion. 04 The EC's
bilateral trade with China had shifted dramatically from a 2.3 billion ECU
surplus in 1985, to a 10 billion ECU deficit in 1991.105 Within the GATT
working party, the representatives from the E.C. and other developed.
nations generally echoed U.S. complaints about China's trade practices.
106
100 Facing pressure to depreciate the swap center rate, China capped this rate at 8.2 yuan per dollar
in February 1993, which caused the swap centers to reduce the total volume of transactions. This forced
many foreign exchange transactions onto the black market. See Nov. 1993 TREASURY REP., supra note 36,
at 25.
101 On February 23, 1993, Beijing imposed tough new restrictions on currency exchanges. As a re-
suit, daily volume on the swap center in Shanghai, China's largest center, dropped from about USs 10
million to about US$ 2.4 million. Anthony Blass, Great Fall of China, FAR EASTERN ECON. REV., Mar. 4,
1993, at 50.
102 Nov. 1993 TREASURY REP., supra note 36, at 25.
103 Id
104 ld at22.
105 See EC Issues Warning to Japan and China on Trade Deficits, Pacts with the U.S., DAILY REP.
FOR ExECUTiVES (BNA), Mar. 18, 1992, at A5.
106 See Talks On China's GATi' Membership End,. supra note 40, at 490.
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For foreign governments, the chief concern was that China's dual-rate
currency system acted like a new barrier to imports. In order to acquire
hard currency at a swap center, the trader first had to state why it needed the
money. The State Administration of Exchange Controls (SAEC), which
administers the swap centers, had wide discretion to turn down applications
for foreign exchange.107 GATT participants were suspicious because China
was applying this form of import control on top of existing measures. In
effect, even applicants who had already procured an import license could be
turned down by the SAEC. Moreover, the SAEC had published only gen-
eral guidelines on which exchanges would be allowed,108 and access to
more detailed information was restricted. In particular, trading enterprises
generally had no access, or very limited access, to the complete SAEC
regulations. 109
Complaints that China's swap centers were being used to restrict
imports began to emerge from the GATT negotiations in 1993. Delegates
from the U.S., Canada, Australia, and the Philippines were quoted in the
press as opposing China's two-tiered exchange rate. 110 In response, China's
delegates at the GATT talks promised that China would achieve a single ex-
change rate of the yuan within five years, and convertibility shortly
thereafter."II Shortly after the talks ended, China confirmed that it would
eliminate its two-tiered currency system in order to join GATT. 112
China announced that it would unify its official and swap center rates
as of January 1, 1994.113 Whether this reform will aid China's accession to
GATT is considered in Part IV below. First, however, it is important to
consider the legal rules and norms that exist within GATT and the IMF re-
lating to currency practices. Thus, Part III below will explain the GATT-
IMF legal framework and attempt to apply this framework to China's
former dual-rate currency. In effect, Part III examines a hypothetical
situation: Imagine that China maintained a dual-rate currency and was
admitted to GATT, would the GATT-IMF rules be applicable in policing
107 Nov. 1993 TREASURY REP., supra note 36, at 24.
108 Id.
109 "Generally, China's foreign exchange system is not transparent. China does'not allow public
access to the regulations governing foreign exchange, including the regulations governing China's swap
centers." Id.
110 Talks On China's GATT Membership End, supra note 40, at 490.
I I I Latest GA 7T Talks on China's Readmission End with No Agreement, Delegates Say, 10 INT'L
TRADE REP. (BNA) 911 (June 2, 1993) [hereinafter Latest GAT Talks].
112 See China to Unify RMB Exchange Rate on January, Xinhua General Overseas News Service,
Dec. 29, 1993, available in LEXIS, News Library, AlIwid File.
113 Id.
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China's dual-rate currency practices? The GATT working party faced this
hypothetical question when it was deciding whether to let China into GATT
with its dual-rate currency, or delay China's entry pending a currency
reform.
III. THE GATT-IMF FRAMEWORK APPLIED TO CHINA'S DUAL-RATE
REGIME
A. Introduction
If China was a GATT member, using GATT rules to police China's
dual-rate currency would be difficult because GATT has long granted pref-
erential treatment to developing nations. 114  The leniency towards
developing nations is not new. Since the end of the Tokyo Round of multi-
lateral talks in 1979, preferential treatment of developing nations has been a
trend within GATT.1I5 The Articles of Agreement of the IMF also grant
lenient treatment to developing nations.116 Thus, in most disputes involving
114 Article XVIlli,'Govemmental Assistance to Economic Development, outlines protective meas-
ures GATr members can take, and is targeted at "those contracting parties the economies of which can
only support low standards of living and are in the early stages of development." GATT CHARTER art.
XVIII. I. In 1979, GATT members accepted Part IV into the charter. Part IV distinguishes between
"developed" and "less developed" contracting parties. and provides special leniency to the latter group.
'There is no formal definition of a "less developed" GAIT member. Instead, members that feel entitled to
this status can simply claim it. JACOBSON & OKSENBERG, supra note 2, at 94. Part IV of GATT includes
several provisions intended to limit the less developed nation's obligations under GATT. Thus, Article
XXXVI, Principles and Objectives, sets the tone of Part IV: "The contracting parties.... (c) noting, that
there is a wide gap between standards of living in less-developed countries and in other countries; ... (f)
noting that the CONTRACTING PARTIES may enable less-developed contracting parties to use special
measures to promote their trade and development; agree as follows." GATT CHARTER art. XVIII, 1. Part
IV then goes on to state the principle that the developed members do not expect less-developed members to
offer reciprocity in exchange for commitments to reduce or remove tariffs and other barriers. Thus, the
less developed members are not expected, in trade negotiations, "to make contributions which are
inconsistent with the individual development, financial and trade needs, taking into consideration past trade
developments." GATT CHARTER art. XXXVI, 8.
115 The Tokyo Round, 1973-1979, focused on the establishment of "differential and more favorable
treatment" for developing nations, a movement which was intended to expand trade of developing nations
by allowing them to grant import preferences to members of their choice, and to avoid GATT's reciprocity
requirements with developed nations. See OLIVER LONG, LAW AND ITS LIMITATIONS IN THE GATT
MULTILATERAL TRADE SYSTEM 89-106 (1985).
116 Under Article IV, the IMF has authority to "exercise firm surveillance" over the exchange rate
policies of its members, but it also must "respect the domestic social and political policies of members."
SECOND AMENDMENT TO THE ARTICLES OF AGREEMENT OF THE IMF art. IV, § 3(b) [hereinafter IMF
ARTICLES OF AGREEMENT]. Article XIV recognizes the IMF's limited reach by allowing an incoming
member to restrict the convertibility of its currency for an unspecified "transitional" period, decided upon
by the member nation. Article XIV, § 2 reads:
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monetary issues, a developing nation like China can fend off criticism by
pointing to GATT117 and IMFI 18 provisions in support of its position.
If admitted to GATT as a less-developed nation, 119 China would
likely be able to use lenient GATT and IMF rules to its advantage.
However, this does not mean that China could act with impunity. While the
GATT charter and GATT rulings do not specifically outlaw dual-rate cur-
rency regimes,120 they do limit a nation's ability to restrict imports for the
purpose of protecting its balance of payments. 121 The IMF charter also
limits when a country can restrict payments related to international trade.122
Thus, as a starting point, it should be emphasized that both GATT and the
IMF have rules that would restrict how China could conduct its foreign ex-
change practices as a GATT member. These rules are considered in more
A member that has notified the Fund that it intends to avail itself of transitional arrangements
under this provision may, notwithstanding the provisions of any other articles of this Agreement,
maintain and adapt to changing circumstances the restrictions on payments and transfers for cur-
rent international transactions that were in effect on the date on which it became a member.
IMF ARTICLES OF AGREEMENT art. XIV, § 2.
117 For example, GATT Art. XVIII shields developing countries from harsh consequences should
they enact trade barriers. Section B of Art. XVIII allows wide-ranging import restrictions when a nation's
monetary reserves are facing "a serious decline," or when a nation "with inadequate monetary reserves"
needs to achieve a "reasonable rate of increase in its reserves." GATT CHARTER art. XVIII, § B. Under §
B, a less developed nation that enacts import restrictions will have to consult with GATT's Balance of
Payments Committee on the issue of its monetary reserves position. However, any other nation that is
adversely affected by the less developed member's import restrictions has in principle no right to
compensation or retaliation under Art. XVIII, § B. The Relationship. supra note 19, at 380.
118 See IMF ARTICLES OF AGREEMENT, supra note 116.
119 China intends to be admitted as a less developed member. China Files Membership Application.
Council Hears U.S. Farm Trade Charges Against Japan. 3 INT'L TRADE REP. (BNA) 915 (July 16. 1988).
GATT has no formal definition of a less developed member. See JACOBSON AND OKSENBERG, supra note
2, at 94.
120 The GATT charter is silent on multiple currency practices. The IMF Articles of Agreement
mentions multiple rate practices in Art. VIII, but does not prohibit them: "No member shall engage in, or
permit any of its fiscal agencies.., to engage in, any discriminatory currency arrangements or multiple
currency practices ... except as authorized under this Agreement or approved by the Fund." IMF
ARTICLES OF AGREEMENT art. VIIi, § 3. Art. VIII goes on to state that ifa member is using discriminatory
currency practices or multiple currency practices when it becomes an IMF member, it can keep these
measures in place under the transitional arrangements of Art. XIV. Nations using Article XIV face annual
reports by the IMF on their currency measures, and agree to remove such barriers once their monetary situ-
ation improves. IMF ARTICLES OF AGREEMENT art. XIV, §§ 2, 3.
121 GATT Art. XVIII(B) provides for oversight of a country's import restrictions taken for balance
of payments reasons. This procedure serves to make sure that any restrictions applied do not violate GATT
rules. GATT CHARTER art. XVIII, § B.
122 The IMF limits on restrictions on payments. A nation entering the IMF can elect to take
advantage of the transitional arrangements under Art. XIV, and thereby keep in place any restrictive
currency practice. A nation taking this step will be subject to annual review by the IMF, and the IMF may
propose that the nation eliminate the restriction. IMF ARTICLES OF AGREEMENT art. XIV, § 3.
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detail below, but first it is important to understand the shared responsibili-
ties of GATT and the IMviF over monetary issues.
B. GATT and the IMF's Historic Compromise on Jurisdiction
GATT and the IMF both oversee monetary issues that affect trade.
Some degree of cooperation is necessary for both organizations since inter-
national trade, by definition, involves the exchange of goods for
payment. 123 Thus, GATT has an interest in ensuring that payment mecha-
nisms used by GATT members do not restrict trade flows.124 The IMF has
the same interest.125 In practice, GATT and the IMF's shared responsibility
has allowed GATT to avoid the task of creating an independent body of
rules and precedents to govern exchange rate policies.
GATT's limited activity in this area is largely an accident of history.
In July 1944, just weeks after the Normandy landings, 45 nations met at the
Bretton Woods Conference to tackle one of the most pressing economic
issues at the time: exchange rate stability. The Bretton Woods talks
produced a charter for the International Monetary Fund (IMF),126 but at that
time a global trade framework was still being planned.127
The GATT charter, ratified in October 1947, was far less ambitious
than the IMF. GATT was originally viewed as a means to encourage trade
concessions through multilateral tariff cuts. 128 Unlike the IMF, GATT
initially had no formal organizational structure, and did not have a
123 The Relationship, supra note 19. at 366.
124 "[GATT] Contracting parties shall not, by exchange action, frustrate the intent of the provisions
of this Agreement." GATT CHARTER art. XV, 4 & amend, art. XV.
125 Among the purposes established by Art. I of the IMF Articles of Agreement is this one: "To
facilitate the expansion and balanced growth of international trade .... IMF ARTICLES OF AGREEMENT
art. 1, ii.
126 The Articles of Agreement of the World Bank were also agreed to at the conference. The IMF
was officially established on Dec. 27. 1945. upon the approval of 29 governments. See generally
MARGARET GARRITSEN DE VRIES, THE IMF IN A CHANGING WORLD: 1945-85. at 3-20 (1986).
127 Roessler notes that the U.S. Dept. of Treasury initially proposed setting up a post-war monetary
institution with authority over both trade and monetary affairs. However, in the post-war era. the U.S. split
up its reconstruction duties by granting the State Department responsibility for world trade policy and the
Department of Treasury responsibility over world monetary affairs. Treasury would later back off its
proposal to give the IMF broad authority over trade, and the State Department would formulate a world
trade body (the ITO) that respected the IMF's jurisdiction over monetary issues. The Relationship, supra
note 19, at 365 & nn.1, 2.
128 See generally U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, PUB. No. 2983, ANALYSIS OF THE GENERAL AGREEMENT
ON TARIFFS AND TRADE (1947) (discussing the broad tariff reductions established by the original GATT
ratification).
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permanent meeting place.129 GATT only became the world's defacto trade
body after the U.S. Congress refused to support the much more ambitious
International Trade Organization (ITO) in 1950.130
While the IMF started as a much more established organization than
GATT, the U.S. and its allies essentially made a pragmatic decision to allow
the IMF and GATT to oversee separate jurisdictions. The IMF would
handle monetary issues, and GATT would handle trade. Of course, the two
bodies had to cooperate in some matters, namely restrictions against pay-
ments (i.e., controls on the spending of hard currency for foreign goods).
The GATT contracting parties knew that payments restrictions could be
used as a trade barrier, 131 but at the same time they respected the IMF's
edict to oversee international monetary issues. Thus, it was logical that both
organizations would play a role in overseeing monetary restrictions that
were used as trade barriers. 32 They both had an interest in this area.
The drafting parties believed that currency measures were a critical
issue. The U.S. State Department, for example, frequently warned that
"exchange restrictions could destroy the freedom [to trade] which it is the
major purpose of the [ITO] proposalsto encourage." 133 (Italics in original).
The concern about currency restrictions stemmed from a dilemma: the
drafting parties knew that quantitative restrictions on trade (i.e., import
quotas) were the most protectionistic of trade measures,134 but they also
knew that in the post-war era some nations would need quantitative restric-
tions in order to protect their monetary reserves. 135 Thus, the contracting
parties had to walk a fine line. In drafting a charter for world trade, they
129 GATT did not have a formal structure in its first ten years. The initial GATT sessions were in-
formal meetings, basically carried over from the preparatory committee of the International Trade
Organization (ITO). In late 1954, Geneva became the defacto site for the organization. See generally
ROBERT E. HUDEC, THE GATT LEGAL SYSTEM AND WORLD TRADE DIPLOMACY 60-65 (1975).
130 See Hearings on Membership and Participation by the United States in the International Trade
Organization Before the House Foreign Affairs Committee. 81st Cong.. 2d Sess. (1950).
131 A 1947 State Department commentary lays out the basic premise: "Quantitative restrictions,
which are the concern of the [International Trade Organization], and exchange restrictions, which are the
concern of the International Monetary Fund, are equally effective methods of controlling trade. It is essen-
tial, therefore, that these two organizations work hand in hand." U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, PUB. NO. 2950,
THE GENEVA CHARTER FOR AN INTERNATIONAL TRADE ORGANIZATION: A COMMENTARY 8 (1947)
[hereinafter U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, PUB. NO. 2950].
132 Id.
133 U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, COMMERCIAL POLICY SERIES, PUB. NO. 2591, NEw HORIZONS FOR
WORLD TRADE 8 (1946).
134 U.S. DEP'TOF STATE, PUB. No. 2950, supra note 13 1, at 6.
135 ld. at 6-7.
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had to disapprove of quotas as a fundamental principle,136 but allow some
limited quotas for nations that were facing monetary crises.
137
For the last forty years, GATT's policy of deferring to the IMF on
issue of payments has allowed it to sidestep the task of creating and
enforcing legal precedents in this area. Thanks to the framework of shared
responsibility, GATT has never been forced to take an independent stand on
currency matters. Instead, GATT has relied on IMF input. Moreover,
GATT and the IMF's cooperation in this area has remained informal.1
38
When both the GATT and the ITO were still under discussion, the U.S.
assumed that whatever trade organization that emerged would "work hand
in hand" with the IMF.139 This "hand in hand" relationship was never
clearly defined in terms of policy coordination. 140 Today, it remains a
target of concern among trade analysts.
14 1
136 A U.S. State Dept commentary expressed the overall policy with regards to drafting of the ITO
charter: "The Geneva Charter [of the ITO] condemns quantitative restrictions in principle. It does not
abolish them, for their use is sometimes legitimate; but it confines them to exceptional circumstances
which are narrowly defined, carefully safeguarded, and subject to international scrutiny and control." Id at
6.
137 Under the ITO charter, three general rules governed when a nation could use the balance of
payments exception to impose import restrictions. First, the country in question could use restrictions
"only to the extent necessary" to keep a reasonable amount of monetary reserves. Second, the country had
to lift the restrictions once its monetary reserves reached a reasonable level. Third, a country imposing
such restrictions had to consult with the ITO. See id. at 7.
138 Roessler describes the relations between GATT and the IMF as "cordial and intellectually
fruitful," but points out that "there is nothing that could be described as policy coordination between the
governing bodies of the two institutions." The Relationship, supra note 19, at 385. The reason for the in-
formal relations is partly historic. In 1948, the Interim Commission for the International Trade
Organization (ITO) drafted an agreement to coordinate relations with the IMF. Under the "Relations
Between the ITO and IMF" agreement, each organization was obliged to consult with the other and
exchange information. Additionally, the agreement provided for reciprocal representation and
participation of the members in one organization in meetings of the other. When the ITO was stillborn, the
idea for a formal agreement linking the IMF to a world trade body was deemed unnecessary. Instead.
GAIT and the IMF agreed to cooperate informally. Idat 385 & n.58.
139 Commentary from the State Dept. demonstrates that the U.S. felt that cooperation between the
IMF and the ITO would be a natural outgrowth of their relationship. The State Dept. did not attempt to
define this cooperative structure, but felt that the two bodies would collaborate on trade issues relating to
balance of payments levels. See U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, PUB. No. 2950, supra note 131, at 7-8.
140 For example, Pierre-Louis Girard, Swiss ambassador to GATT, has commented that GATT is
still "paying today" for decisions made over 40 years ago to split jurisdiction between GATT and the IMF.
In particular, the GATT-IMF relationship has failed to establish "a meaningful policy coordination" with
respect to trade restrictions taken for balance of payments purposei. Pierre-Louis Girard, The Relationship
Between the World Trade Order and the International Monetary System: A Comment, in 5 THE NEW GATT
ROUND OF MULTILATERAL TRADE NEGOTIATIONS: LEGAL AND ECONOMIC PROBLEMS 387, 389, 391
(Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann & Meinhard Hilf eds., 1988).
141 Id
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C. GA 7TArticle XV and the Structure of GA TT-IMF Cooperation
Article XV of the GATT charter outlines the GATT and IMF's coor-
dinated policy for overseeing exchange rate arrangements. The principle of
Article XV is that currency matters fall within the jurisdiction of both or-
ganizations. As a 1954 report on the GATT-IMF relationship concluded,
"in many instances it is difficult or impossible to define clearly whether a
government measure is financial [i.e., monetary] or trade in character and
frequently it is both."142 Article XV of GATT explains the shared respon-
sibility over exchange rate and balance of payments issues:
In all cases in which the CONTRACTING PARTIES are
called upon to consider or deal with problems concerning
monetary reserves, balances of payments or foreign exchange
arrangements, they shall consult fully with the International
Monetary Fund. In such consultations, the CONTRACTING
PARTIES shall accept all findings of statistical and other facts
presented by the Fund. 143
In effect, this provision allows the GATT contracting parties to avoid
ruling on a member's exchange rate mechanism pending a factual analysis
from the IMF.
Note that Article XV offers very little in the way of guidelines. It
does not tell GATT members what sort of currency mechanisms are permit-
ted. Article XV merely states that "Contracting parties shall not, by
exchange action, frustrate the intent of the provisions of this Agreement."'14
(emphasis added). Article XV does not attempt to define the "intent" of the
GATT charter, nor does it suggest how exchange rate actions might frustrate
this "intent." GATT's deferral to the IMF is supposed to illuminate techni-
cal issues related to currency mechanisms, but it remains GATT's duty to
decide when a nation's exchange actions violate the GATT charter.
One problem with deferral is that the IMF does not have a reciprocal
obligation to consult with GATT on trade issues that affect monetary
142 Reports Relating to the Review of the Agreement, GATT Doc. L332, Basic Instruments and
Selected Documents (BISD) 3rd Supp. 170, 196 (adopted Mar. 2, 4, 5, 1955).
143 GATT CHARTER art XV, 2.
144 GATT CHARTER art. XV, 4.
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affairs. 145 In creating the post-war institutions, the world powers initially
desired that the IMF and the ITO would establish formal ties to coordinate
their policies. 146 But when the ITO failed to materialize, it was thought at
the time that GATT did not need a formal relationship with the I1F.147 In
lieu of formal ties, GATT would rely on the IMF as a provider of informa-
tion. The IMF, however, had no obligation to accept GATT's findings on
trade matters.
IMF independence on monetary affairs has translated into a world
where the IMF has created its own standards and exceptions relating to cur-
rency practices. For example, regarding multiple-rate structures, Article
VIII(3) of the IMF's Articles of Agreement states the Fund's general disap-
proval of this practice:
No member nation shall engage in, or permit any of its
fiscal agencies ... to engage in, any discriminatory currency
arrangements or multiple currency practices, except as author-
ized under this Agreement or approved by the Fund.1
48
In practice, the IMF has never clearly delineated when exactly a
country can use multiple rates. 149 It has struggled with the issue, and has
ultimately decided to allow some multiple rate regimes. Thus, in a 1981
decision, the executive board of the IMF ruled that multiple rate practices
would be tolerated if they are maintained to protect a shortfall in the
nation's balance of payments.150 A nation imposing multiple rates would
have to promise that the practice will be temporary, and that it will not
145 Frieder Roessler, Selective Balance-of-Payments Adjustment Measures Affecting Trade: The
Roles of the GA Tand the IMF, 9 J. WORLD TRADE LAW 622, 643 (Nov.-Dec. 1975) [hereinafter Roles of
the GA TT and the IMF].
146 Id.
147 Id. at 644.
148 IMF ARTICLES OF AGREEMENT art. Viii, § 3.
149 In a 1981 decision, the IMF established the general conditions under which a multiple exchange
rate regime would be allowed:
[Tihe Fund will be prepared to grant approval of multiple currency practices introduced or
maintained for balance of payments reasons provided the member represents and the Fund is
satisfied that the measures are temporary and are being applied while the member is endeavoring
to eliminate its balance of payments problems, and provided they do not give the member an un-
fair competitive advantage over othei members or discriminate among members.
Policy on Multiple Currency Practices, at 2, IMF Dec. No. 6790-(81/43) (Mar. 20, 1981) (printed in
SELECTED DECISIONS AND SELECTED DOCUMENTS OF THE INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND, 17TH ISSUE,
371-72 .
I Id
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create "an unfair competitive advantage over other members or discriminate
among members."151
In a dispute involving Article XV, GATT must rely on statistical in-
formation provided by the IMF, but the IMF may have already agreed to
provide special leniency to the country in question. On a procedural level,
this framework of GATT-IMF cooperation requires GATT to import a
broad range of IMF information. 5 2 The relative weight of the IMF's opin-
ions has never been clarified. In practice; the IMF has often been sensitive
about reporting on a nation's monetary situation, and thus tends to shy away
from offering concrete opinions. 153 Sometimes the IMF puts forth a
recommendation. 154 But it often favors a status quo approach and does not
make recommendations to GATT.155 Ultimately, the Article XV framework
has left GATT with little independent authority to decide trade disputes
caused by monetary policies.
1. China's Dual-Rate Currency Applied to Article AV
If China had been admitted to GATT before 1994, Article XV would
have required GATT to weigh the IMF's input on China's dual-rate cur-
rency mechanism. The process of the Article XV examination would have
been lengthy due to the need to collect data. Moreover, GATT has special
procedures for less-developed nations which are designed to ease their bur-
den in facing periodic review sessions. 156 These procedures, contained in
Article XVIII(B), serve to lengthen the data collection period by allowing
151 Id
152 Art. XV states in part: "[GATT] shall accept the determination of the Fund [on the nation's
level of monetary reserves], and as to the financial aspects of other matters covered in consultation in such
cases." GATT CHARTER art. XV, 2.
153 As Roessler noted. "The lack of procedures guaranteeing confidentiality has made the [IMF]
reluctant to suggest in consultations with GATT alternative balance-of-payments measures (in particular
devaluations or capital controls)." Roles of the GATTandthe IMF. supra note 145, at 650.
154 Id. at 647.
155 Id
156 Most developing nations that impose import restrictions for balance of payments reasons tend to
have long-term problems. Thus, they have asked for, and been granted, special leniency with regards to
the timing of consultations with GATT. Frieder Roessler, The GATT Declaration on Trade Measures
Taken for Balance-of-Payments Purposes: A Commentary, 12 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L. 383, 395 (1980)
[hereinafter The GAT Declaration]. Article XVIII(B), introduced in 1955, extended the period between
regular consultations from one year (under Article XII) to two years for nations that adopted protective
measures allowed under Article XVIII(B). GATT CHARTER art. XVIII, § B, 12(b).
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less-developed members to submit to consultations on their balance of pay-
ments situation every two years instead of annually.]
57
As a GATT member China would have potentially faced several
Article XV complaints under its dual-rate structure. Part II above points out
the nature of these complaints. First, a nation could argue that China's
dual-rate structure had served to unfairly subsidize many of China's state-
run industries. Second, China had often applied the dual rates in a way that
taxed foreign exchange transactions and restricted imports. A GATT mem-
ber could have argued that either or both of these results "frustrate the
intent" of the GATT charter, and thus could have pursued a trade complaint
against China based on Article XV.
However, the initial difficulty with these complaints is that GATT
could only examine China's "foreign exchange arrangements" in coopera-
tion with the IMF. The basis for such an investigation would be IMF
information, including data on exchange rates and balance of payments.
The investigation itself would be a series of multilateral talks open to any
GATT member that wanted to participate on the Balance of Payments
Committee.158
It is likely that China would benefit by such a process. The GATT
consultation mechanism blunts any single member's ability to pursue trade
actions against another member. This, of course, is one object of multilat-
eralism. However, in practice the party bringing the complaint must rely on
a key external variable: the willingness of the IMF to cooperate.159 In the
past, the IMF has often not been willing to offer recommendations about a
nation's monetary situation because it fears that news leaks might lead to
adverse market reactions. 160 Often the IMF simply reports to GATT that "it
has no alternative measures to suggest."161 Thus, while the goal of the
GA'IT-IMF framework is to encourage a nation to adopt corrective
measures, the sensitivity of foreign exchange matters makes it difficult for
either GATT or the IMF to be explicit about the solutions needed. 162
For the GATT member bringing a complaint against China, another
unpredictable issue would be the extent to which information other than
IMF data would be incorporated in the fact-finding process. For example, if
157 Id
158 The Relationship, supra note 19, at 380.
159 Girard, supra note 140, at391.
160 Roles of the GA 7T and the IMF, supra note 145, at 650.
161 Id at 650&n.77.
162 The GA 7T Declaration, supra note 156, at 392.
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China needed to supply data to the RMF or to GATT, China's performance
in the Uruguay Round suggests that this itself would be a drawn-out
process. 163 It is also unclear how much GATT's Balance of Payments
Committee would rely on outside information, such as reports provided by
the U.S. Treasury or other GATT members.
A final uncertainty would be the conclusion of the Balance of
Payments Committee, which would incorporate any input from the IMF. In
practice, the shared responsibility of GATT and the IMF within Article XV
has insured that conclusions from the Balance of Payments Committee re-
main informal and diplomatic. An example is provided by Frieder Roessler,
Senior Counsel in the GATT Legal Office. Roessler points out an actual
conclusion from the Balance of Payments Committee, in which he has re-
placed the nation's name with the letter A:
The Committee welcomed the trend toward a progressive
relaxation in the application of A's import restrictions. It noted
the view of the [IMF] that the overall restrictiveness of the
import regime did not go beyond what was necessary to
prevent a decline in A's international reserves. It also noted
the relatively favourable prospects for A's balance of
payments. The Committee noted with satisfaction the
determination of A's authorities to continue relaxing remaining
restrictions .... 164
The purpose of the Balance of Payments Committee, as evidenced
here, is to put forth broad conclusions on whether the nation's import re-
strictions are allowable under the GATT charter given the nation's
monetary and balance of payments situation. These conclusions do not
clearly indicate the facts upon which they are based.165 In a 1975 report, the
Committee explained that it does not want to state exactly which trade re-
163 In the Uruguay Round, China answered an enormous number of questions on its trade practices.
JACOBSON & OKSENBERG, supra note 2, at 96. However, many of China's answers were apparently
insufficient, prompting more questions and delays. See, e.g., Latest GA7T Talks, supra note I 11, at 911;
Talks on China's GA7T Membership End, supra note 40, at 490; Talks on Accession to GA7T Seem
Unlikelyto Leadto Much Progress, 10 INT'L TRADE REP. (BNA) 445 (Mar. 17, 1993).
1 The GATT Declaration, supra note 156, at 397.
165 Id
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strictions are allowable because these "could be taken by contracting parties
as a carte blanche for imposing measures within the limits specified."'
166
Thus, in the case of China's dual-rate structure, the success or failure
of trade complaints brought under Article XV would have depended on a
number of uncertain variables. Of particular concern is the nature of the
fact-finding process. The following section examines the importance of
IMF fact-finding on monetary reserves, and how the IMF's inconclusive
data on China's monetary reserves would probably make it difficult to pur-
sue an Article XV complaint if China was a GATT member.
D. Applying Ariicle XV: The Balance of Payments Exception
The GATT charter provides an exception to the Article XV rule that
monetary restrictions "shall not frustrate the intent" of the charter. Article
XV states that in examining any trade restrictions enforced for balance of
payments reasons, the IMF should determine wlether a country is suffering
"a serious decline" in its monetary reserves, "a very low level" of monetary
reserves, or "a reasonable rate of increase" in its monetary reserves, in ac-
cordance with Articles XII and XVIII(B). In effect, monetary reserves and
balance of payments provide the same information. Both figures reflect a
nation's trade imbalance. In other words, they show how much hard cur-
rency a nation is spending on goods and services versus how much hard
currency it is taking in.167 A sharp drop in a nation's monetary reserves, as
evidenced by a declining balance of payments, is an indicator that the nation
needs to increase its earnings of hard currency. One way to do this is to re-
strict overall spending on imports.
GATT's balance of payments exception under Article XV allows a
nation suffering a "serious decline" or a "very low level" of monetary re-
serves to implement import quotas in order to protect its monetary situation.
This exception is based on the assumption that if a nation restricts imports
of certain goods through a quota, then it will reduce overall spending of
hard currency. As noted in the two sections below, this assumption is no
longer valid for developed nations, but it is still applicable for less-
developed nations, including China.
166 Id. at 398 (quoting unpublished GATT report: Balance of Payments Committee, Note by the
Comm., Appendix and Annexes, GATT Doc. L4200, at 14-15).
167 The Relationship, supra note 19, at 375.
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1. Developed Nations and the Balance of Payments Exception
GATT's balance of payments exception stem from the era of fixed
exchange rates which emerged after World War II and lasted up to the early
1970s.168 Under the Bretton Woods framework, 169 the IMF achieved global
exchange rate stability by requiring the developed nations to peg their cur-
rency rates to so-called "par values," which translated into a peg against
gold and the U.S. dollar, or in some cases against sterling.170 This pegged
rate was not supposed to shift by more than 1% in either direction. 17 1 Thus,
when a country experienced a balance of payments deficit (i.e., there was
too much of its own currency in the foreign exchange market, and not
enough U.S. dollars), its currency would face downward pressure. To keep
the currency within 1% of its par-value, the government would have to
spend its U.S. dollar holdings to mop up its excess currency in the foreign
exchange market. Thus, irrespective of Article XV's requirement not to
"frustrate the intent" of the charter, the GATT charter had to be flexible so
that nations facing threats to their monetary reserves could restrict U.S.
dollar payments on imports.
Italy, for example, adopted a mandatory surcharge on about 40% of
all imports in 1974 because its central bank was running short of U.S. dol-
lars. 172 At the time, Italy needed the extra U.S. dollars earned through the
surcharge in order to maintain the value of the Italian lira. Although the de-
posit scheme was clearly an import barrier, GATT approved it based on the
Article XII balance of payments exception. 173 After conferring with the
IM , -GAIT ruled that Italy's balance of payments situation was
"exceptionally serious." 74
168 See Schools Brief Managing the World's Economy, ECONOMIST, May 24, 1975, at 27-29
[hereinafter Schools Brie].
169 The Bretton Woods framework for international payments hinged on fixed exchange rates. It
also allowed nations to borrow from the IMF under special "IMF drawing rights," and to change their ex-
change rates if they faced a "fundamental dis-equilibrium" in their monetary situation. Id at 27.
170 Id
171 Id
172 As of May 7, 1974, Italy required the payment of a temporary import deposit equal of 50% of
the c.i.f. value (cost of goods, insurance, and freight) of the imported goods, to be paid and then held by the
Italian government (with no interest accruing) for 180 days. Ultimately, GAIT's Balance of Payments
Committee, after conferring with the IMF, recognized that Italy's balance of payments situation was
"exceptionally serious," and the measures were allowed under Art. XII. Italian Import Deposit, GATT.
Doc L-4082, BISD 21st Supp. 121, 125 (Oct. 21, 1974).
173 Id at 125.
174 Id
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Article XI's balance of payments exception became largely irrele-
vant after the Bretton Woods par-value system broke down between 1967-
1972.175 The Bretton Woods model proved to be unsustainable in a world
of competitive exchange rates. 176 Pressure to devalue the U.S. dollar and
the British pound eventually caused a collapse of the par value system, and
most currencies from developed nations were allowed to float starting from
about 1972-1974.177 With floating rates, developed nations faced reduced
pressure to maintain their currency value against an agreed upon par
value. 178
Today Italy would have a difficult time claiming that it must impose a
deposit on imports in order to shore up its monetary reserves. The reason
this argument would likely fail is that the rate of the lira is no longer pegged
to a par value, and thus there is no general agreement on what the rate of the
lira should be. Italy can choose to devalue its currency or protect the value
of its currency by investing in the currency market. It is through such inter-
vention that a nation can protect its exchange rate and its monetary
reserves.
17 9
Since the end of the par-value system, GATT discouraged nations
from enacting import restrictions in order to correct a deficiency in balance
of payments.' 80 With freely convertible currencies, restricting imports to
shore up reserves is viewed as an inefficient option because consumers will
likely shift their spending to other goods. Their overall consumption will.
likely not decline.'18 For example, if a nation bans the import of sports cars
to protect its balance of payments, normally this will have not have a pre-
dictable effect on consumers' ability to buy other types of imported
goods.182 Given the availability of imports and consumer access to hard
currency, trade restrictions in a developed nation have an unpredictable
175 See generally Schools Brief supra note 168, at 28-29.
176 Id at28.
177 ld at 28-29.
178 After the era of fixed exchange rates, the major currencies were allowed to float, but not without
government interventions. Most tradable currencies are weighted against baskets of other currencies, with
the contents of each basket decided by the proportion of the country's trade with each other country. Id at
29.
179 Id
180 See Declaration on Trade Measures Taken for Balance-of-Payments Purposes, GATT Doc.
L/4094, BISD 26th Supp. 205 (Nov. 28, 1979) ("Convinced that restrictive trade measures are in general
an inefficient means to maintain or restore balance-of-payments equilibrium.").
181 The Relationship, supra note 19, at 375 & n.34 (quoting GAlT report, International Trade
1982/83: "A change in trade barriers will alter the pattern of consumer spending, but there is no direct im-
pact on the level of consumption.").
182 Id at 375-76.
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effect on consumer spending habits. In a world of floating exchange rates,
the balance of payments exception for developed nations has thus become
largely irrelevant.183
2. Less-Developed Nations and the Balance of Payments Exception
The balance of payments exception of Article XVIII(B), targeted at
less-developed nations, remains a significant rule today. This article allows
less-developed countries to restrict imports in order to "safeguard [their]
external financial position and to ensure a level of reserves adequate for the
implementation of [their] programme of economic development."184 This
broad provision goes on to state that a less-developed nation may imple-
ment import restrictions:
(i) to forestall the imminent threat of, or to stop, a serious
decline in [a member's] monetary reserves, or
(ii) in the case of a contracting party with inadequate
monetary reserves, to achieve a reasonable rate of increase in
its reserves. 185
Applying Article XVIII(B) in a fair manner has been difficult. 8 6 As
noted above, GATT has tried to steer all members away from adopting re-
strictive trade measures in order to protect monetary reserves.187 In 1979,
GATT resolved that trade restrictions were an "inefficient means to main-
tain or restore balance of payments equilibrium." 88 In other words, a
nation should not restrict sportswear imports if its goal is to protect mone-
tary reserves. In the same declaration, however, GATT noted that a less
developed nation could still use import restrictions, but it would have to
justify its balance of payments difficulties to GATT's Balance of Payments
183 Id. at 386.
184 GAT CHARTER art. XVIll, § B, 9.
185 Id.
186 Roessler points out that while Article XVIII(B) was meant to take into account a nation's exter-
nal financial constraints, in reality many of these difficulties are structural rather than monetary. Thus,
there is a strong tendency to rely on the allowable import restrictions under Article XVIII(B) to assist
certain domestic sectors of a nation's economy. As a result, the protections under Article XVIII(B) tend to
be invoked for a lengthy period: In late 1988, 16 out of 18 GATT members that were using Article
XVIII(B) protection had been doing so for over 10 years. The Relationship, supra note 19, at 380-81.
18 See Declaration on Trade Measures Taken for Balance-of-Payments Purposes, supra note 180.
188 Id. at 205.
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Committee. 189 The Committee, in turn, is to obtain its statistical informa-
tion on the nation's balance of payments situation from the IMF, as stated in
Article XV. In practice, the Committee has almost no authority to force a
nation to give up its import restrictions enacted under Article XVIII(B). For
example in the 1980s, at least 16 nations that had invoked Article XVIII(B)
authority to limit imports had kept these measures in place for over ten
years. 190
The 1979 GATT decision established a very lenient standard for less-
developed countries. The declaration recognized outright "that the less-.
developed contracting parties must take into account their individual
development, financial and trade situation when implementing restrictive
import measures taken for balance-of-payment purposes." 19
1  In other
words, a less-developed nation's "individual development, financial and
trade situation" may allow that nation to restrict imports in order to preserve
its balance of payments.1
92
Most critical of all is that the remedies under Article XVIII(B) are
virtually non-existent for a GATT member that is affected by any Article
XVIII(B) import restrictions. Article XVIII(B) does not, in principle, grant
any right for an aggrieved nation to collect compensation or retaliate against
a less developed member.193 This means that a nation invoking Article
XVIII(B) may have to face ongoing consultations with the Balance of
Payments Committee, but it can avoid any harsh retaliation from other
GATT members.
GATT's leniency towards less developed nations does not mean that
they can choose any measure to restrict imports. GATT does not want
members to impose arbitrary or secret trade restrictions. Thus, the Uruguay
Round modified Article XVIII(B) and the 1979 Declaration by encouraging
nations with balance of payments difficulties to adopt "price-based
measures," which are deemed to have the least disruptive effect on trade
compared to import quotas. 194 "Price-based measures" include import sur-
charges and deposit requirements such as the measure adopted by Italy in
189 Id at 206-8.
190 The Relationship, supra note 19, at 381.
191 Declaration on Trade Measures Taken for Balance-of-Payments Purposes supra note 180, at
206.
192 Id.
193 The Relationship, supra note 19, at 380.
194 Understanding on the Balance-Of-Payments Provisions of the General Agreement on Tariffs and
Trade at 2, Dec. 15, 1993, Final Act Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade
Negotiations.
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1974. These restrictions can generally be applied in an open, "transparent
manner" 195 to all trading partners, and thus are viewed as more fair than
selective bans or quotas on certain products.
3. China's Dual-Rate Currency System Applied to the Balance of
Payments Exception
As a GATT member and a less developed nation, China's use of a
dual-rate currency probably would have been allowable under the Article
XVIII(B) balance of payments exception. The key inquiry would be
whether China's monetary reserves were facing "the threat of... a serious
decline," or were "inadequate."1 96 In either case, China could enact import
restrictions to protect its reserves, although it would have to justify its
choices to the Balance of Payments Committee. Under the shared jurisdic-
tion principle of Article XV, the actual data upon which the Balance of
Payments Committee would judge China's monetary reserves situation
would come from the IMF.
The problem with determining. China's monetary reserves is that the
data is inconclusive. Up to 1992, China's monetary reserves had increased
but in 1993, they began to fall sharply. 197 A growing trade deficit and cur-
rency outflows had drained hard currency from the People's Bank of China
and the state-run Bank of China. 198 For example, China's reserves had
dropped from $46.8 billion 199 at the end of 1992, to $38.2 billion200 at the
beginning of 1993, a decline of 14%.201 By June 1993, China had only
enough reserves to cover 4.4 months of merchandise imports, which was
above the standard safety threshold of 3 months, but down sharply from
earlier years.202 Moreover, many analysts believed that data on China's
195 Id. at 4. "Transparent" means that the regulation is applied in a non-discriminatory matter to
all parties, and does not involve any hidden costs to outsiders.
196 GATT CHARTER art. XVIII, § B, 9(a)(b).
197 See generally Julia Leung, China's Forex Reserves Fall, Reflecting Worsening Trade Balance,
Capital Flight, ASIAN WALL ST. J. WKLY., Oct. 4, 1993, at 23.
198 Id.
199 Id.
200 China's monetary reserves are held by the central bank, the People's Bank of China, and the
state-owned Bank of China. Starting from 1992, China no longer included the monetary holdings of the
Bank of China in its total reserves calculation, but the U.S. Treasury and many economists believe this is
misleading since the Bank of China reserves would no doubt be available if the state needed them. See
Nov. 1993 TREAsURY REP., supra note 36, at 21 & n.I.
201 Leung, supra note 197, at 23.
202 Id.
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balance of payments account did not accurately reflect the problem of short-
term capital outflows.203
Given the uncertain data on China, it would be difficult for GATT or
the IMF to ascertain the severity of China's balance of payments situation if
a trade complaint arose under Article XV. For example, the growing com-
plexity in the linkages between China, Hong Kong, and foreign investors
has obscured how much money is flowing in and out of China.204 Signs of
this are apparent in China's statistical reporting. Between the first half and
the second half of 1992, the category of "errors and omissions" in China's
balance of payments account more than doubled (from $5.8 to $12.2
billion), likely reflecting a large increase in short-term capital outflows. 205
What probably worried GATT members during the Uruguay Round is
that China, as a member, would have qualified for the Article XVIII(B)(9)
balance of payments exception based on its 1993 decrease in monetary re-
serves and the uncertain data. China could have argued that the 14% drop
in reserves qualified as a "threat," and thus China was justified to enact im-
port restrictions to forestall a further decline. China might also have
benefited from the overall uncertainty of the data, depending on which in-
formation the Balance of Payments Committee decided to consider, and
how heavily it weighed such information. At least some observers believed
that by the end of 1992, China was recording net capital outflows, instead of
inflows as indicated by China's official statistics.
206
203 Many economists agree that China's capital movements are not accurately reflected in China's
official statistics. Peter Harrold and Rajiv Lall, writing for the World Bank, contend that short-term capital
outflows are not accounted for in China's data. In large part this is due to the growing number of foreign
subsidiaries of Chinese firms and the increasing numbers of"legal and illegal channels for funds to move
in and out of China." Harrold & Lall, supra note 76, at 14. The Wall St. Journal has editorialized on the
nature of these legal and illegal channels. Noting that estimates of China's hidden capital outflows in
1992, range from US$ 8 billion to US$ 20 billion, The Wall St. Journal pointed a finger at official
corruption:
[lit's safe to assume that much of the outflow represents the illegal gains of well-connected
Chinese officials. Nobody doubts that turning state assets into private riches has become the
primary occupation of the families of party bigwigs. For all we know, though, these illicit riches
are making a round trip, dipping offshore just long enough to disguise ownership and qualify for
the tax advantages due foreign investors and joint-venturers.
Lenders can hardly be so confident that the billions loaned directly to Beijing aren't being
squandered or salted away. Nor can the share investors now being courted to become Beijing's
partners in dozens of state enterprises discount the possibility that their funds will end up in the
regime's retirement accounts rather than paying to upgrade production and return them a profit.
China's Footloose Capital, WALL ST. J., Mar. 8, 1994, at A 18.
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Assuming China could qualify for the balance of payments exception
under Article XVIII(B), the second question would have been whether the
measures China adopted to restrict imports (i.e., restricting access to the
swap centers) were valid under GATT rules. Recall that the swap centers
restricted imports by denying access to foreign exchange. A GATT member
could have certainly argued that these import restrictions were not enforced
in a "transparent" manner,207 since they were not applied evenly to all
nations. Also, the rules governing currency transactions were often so
broad that officials could use their discretion to deny access if they
wanted.2
08
However, China's method of restricting imports is a detail in the
context of an Article XVIII(B) dispute. For GATT members, the real worry
was that China could minimally qualifyfor the balance of payments excep-
tion. Since Article XVIII(B) affords no opportunity for retaliation, if China
qualified for this exception then the worst it would face would be a series of
consultations with the Balance of Payments Committee. In effect, once
China qualified under Article XVIII(B), the Balance of Payments
Committee could do little more than question China and provide advice on
alternative measures.
In an Article XVIII(B) dispute, GATT could try to steer China to-
wards adopting some kind of across-the-board pricing measure, such as a
surcharge on imports. But China, as a less-developed nation, could make a
strong case for leniency. As the 1979 resolution states, a less-developed
nation may take into account its "individual development, financial, and
trade situation" in deciding which type of trade restrictions to impose.209
China could argue that given its former import substitution policies and
overvalued currency, a dual-rate regime was an essential step in integrating
its economy with the outside world. China could ask for more time to over-
haul its currency structure. China might have succeeded, especially if the
IMF and the data was supportive. On balance, the factors to be weighed
seemed to favor lenient treatment for China. Thus, the working party
sought to delay China's membership.
207 See Understanding on the Balance-Of-Payments Provisions of the General Agreement on Tariffs
and Trade 4, supra, note 194, at I (requiring that import restrictions taken for balance of payments
reasons "shall be administered in a transparent manner").
208 Nov. 1993 TREASURY REP., supra note 36, at 24.
209 Declaration on Trade Measures Taken for Balance-Of-Payments Purposes, supra note 180, at
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IV. POST-URUGUAY STRATEGIES FOR CHINA AND GATT
A. Background on the Close of the Uruguay Round
The Uruguay Round ended with two conclusions reached regarding
China's accession. First, the working party decided that China was not yet
ready to accede to GATT. Second, China's dual-rate currency mechanism
had become one of the key obstacles to China's bid.210 Interestingly, after
the Uruguay Round closed, even China 21' agreed that it would have to unify
its exchange rates to join GATT. The parties had indeed reached some
common ground on the need of exchange rate reform.
Each party working on China's bid (the GATT working party, the
U.S., and Beijing) had its own reasons for favoring currency reform. Their
reasons stemmed from the inapplicability of the GATT-IMF framework
against China's currency practices. In the end, China was deemed not ready
to join GATT, but China hoped to do so once it unified its exchange
rates.2 12 The question remains whether Beijing's currency reforms imple-
mented on January 1, 1994,213 will be enough to ensure China's
membership to GATT.
B. China Announces a Unified Exchange Rate
At the end of 1993, China announced that it would unify its official
rate and the swap center rate as of January 1, 1994.214 This surprise deci-
sion presents a new dimension to the GATT talks. Although the Uruguay
Round had already ended when China made the announcement, China will
continue meeting with the GATT working party in Geneva, and hopes to be
admitted to the trade body by early 1995,215 in time for the WTO. In
210 See Talks on China's GA TT Membership End4 supra note 40. at 490.
211 See New Foreign Exchange Rate. supra note 41.
212 Id
213 See China: Central Bank's Note on New Foreign Exchange System, BUSINESS WEEK (China
Daily Supp.), Jan. 23, 1994, available in LEXIS, News Library, AlIwid File [hereinafter Note on New
Foreign Exchange System].214 1,d
215 China would like to be a member of GATT" so that it can be a founding member of the World
Trade Organization, which will succeed GATT' in 1995. Frances Williams, GA7T Members Warm to
China's Entry, FIN. TIMES (London), Mar. 16, 1994, at 7.
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China's view, the single rate structure now in place should put to rest the
GATT's concern about exchange rate matters.216
China's new currency mechanism eliminates the dual-rate structure
and replaces it with a single rate. However, it is unclear to what extent the
new system will avoid the problems of the swap centers, such as arbitrary
access to foreign exchange and hidden regulations. On January 1, 1994, the
new unified exchange rate was set at 8.7 yuan per dollar, in line with the
former swap center rate. In effect, the former official rate of 5.7 was
devalued about 52% to reach the new unified rate. Perhaps the most
important point of the currency reforms is that the former retention system,
which allowed certain enterprises to keep 50% of their foreign exchange
earnings, was eliminated. In its place, China has created an inter-bank
foreign exchange market, where domestic enterprises are allowed to acquire
hard currency as long as they have the proper import licenses. 217
The workings of China's new foreign exchange rules remain unclear.
According to China's public statements, most non-business enterprises and
individuals will be allowed to have foreign currency accounts,2 18 as will
some investment and holding enterprises.219 Foreign-invested companies
likewise will have foreign exchange cash accounts, but it is unclear whether
they will be able to acquire hard currency at Chinese banks.2 20 The swap
centers apparently remain in place for the purpose of serving foreign com-
panies.221 Thus, the government seems to be sensitive to the currency needs
of foreign investors, and does not want to change the former system too
quickly. However, there are also indications that Chinese banks continue to
216 Wu Yi, minister of foreign trade and economic co-operation, was quoted on Dec. 29, 1993, as
saying: "The adoption of a new single floating exchange rate from January 1, 1994, will help bring China's
foreign trade operations closer to the international norms and play a positive role in resuming China's sig-
natory status in the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade." See New Foreign Exchange Rate, supra
note 4 1.
217 See Note on New Foreign Exchange System, supra note 213.
218 Diplomatic missions, offices of international organizations, "and other non-resident legal entities
in China" will be allowed to have foreign currency accounts. Id.
219 Foreign currency accounts will be allowed for: "remittance(s) for the purpose of investments by
any nonresident legal entities and natural persons.... external borrowing.... finds remitted back to China
by the service contract companies within the contract period of their overseas projects for current use of the
project, and] receipts from foreign donations and grants." Id
2 2 0 "If, for the purpose of production, operation, debts service, and profit remittance, they need
more foreign exchange after being authorized by the foreign exchange administrative departments accord-
ing to relevant regulations, these enterprises can also purchase foreign exchange from the designated
banks." Id.
221 Carl Goldstein, 4 Lighter Shade of Red, FAR EASTERN ECON. REV., Apr. 28, 1994, at 79.
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restrict access to foreign exchange requests made by domestic compa-
nies.m22
After several months of delay, China finally opened a national ex-
change center in Shanghai on April 4, 1994,223 to exchange U.S. dollars,
Hong Kong dollars, and yuan. The Shanghai center is to be the hub of
China's inter-bank exchange market. It links to trading centers in Beijing,
Tianjin, Hangzhou, Shenzhen, and Guangzhou. Altogether, thirteen do-
mestic banks and over eighty other Chinese and foreign banks and non bank
financial institutions will interact with the Shanghai market. Although the
inter-bank market draws in money traders from throughout the country, the
government will apparently keep the yuan rate tightly controlled.
224
For GATT members, the key inquiry is how China chooses to limit
expenditures of foreign exchange under this inter-bank system. Recall that
dual currency rates are against GATT principles because: (1) they allow
nations to arbitrarily subsidize certain industries; and (2) through
administrative measures, dual currency rates are easily parlayed into an
additional level of import barrier. The working party handling China's bid
might be convinced that China's unitary rate has solved the first problem.
With a single rate, China's exchange rate practices will no longer subsidize
certain sectors by allowing them to buy and sell foreign exchange at the
most favorable price. Thus, the former system of cross-subsidies, at least as
they were applied through China's dual-rate regime, is perhaps no longer a
worry. However, the second problem is far from solved. The working party
has a right to scrutinize how the new inter-bank market will be adminis-
tered. The working party should ask for proof that the inter-bank market
will allow fair access to foreign exchange, based on rules that are known by
all buyers.
Regardless of China's public confidence that its currency reform will
vault it into GATT, it is unclear that Beijing has solved the problem of arbi-
trariness with respect to who gets access to foreign exchange.225
222 Id
223 National Foreign Exchange Trading Centre Opens in Shanghai, BBC Summary of World
Broadcasts, Apr. 9, 1994, available in LEXIS, News Library, AlIwld File (translation of New China News
agency report).224 On the first day of trading at the Shanghai.market, the U.S. dollar opened at 8.681 yuan and
traded within a very narrow range: between 8.7265 and 8.681 yuan, or about .5% above the opening rate.
Trading closed at 8.6908 yuan. Id
225 China outwardly recognizes that standardized rules on foreign exchange transactions are an
essential requirement: "Rules and regulations will be made to normalize and legalize the foreign exchange
trading so that the regulation and supervision can be conducted with a sound legal base." Id
1994
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Administrators of the Shanghai market, for example, may be granted dis-
cretion to curtail trading or reject requests for exchanges just as the swap
centers used to do. Only time will answer this question.
Ultimately, the working party should be careful not to judge China's
new currency mechanism in isolation, but should instead ask how the
effects of China's new inter-bank market might be nullified through other
measures. Consider, for example, China's announcement on January 1, that
it will restrict imports on machinery and electronics in 1994.226 China em-
phasized that these new restrictions would be implemented in the form of
quotas, but once again this points out that the definition of "quota" is a
slippery one. To China, a quota on the import of machinery and electronics
might mean a quota in effect (i.e., that banks in the inter-bank market will
arbitrarily decide which enterprises have access to foreign exchange in
order to import machinery and electronics). As noted above, this sort of
restriction might still be defensible under GATT's Article XVIII(B) balance
of payments exception, assuming China's monetary reserves are at risk, but
at minimum it would require open publication of the quota and consultation
with GATT's Balance of Payments Committee.
C. Renewed Attention Needed on the Issue of Transparency
The debate concerning quotas versus currency controls will continue
in the GATT talks, but at least one obstacle for China has become clear:
GATT members' criticism of China's former dual-rate currency system is
mainly based on how China administered that system through internal
regulations. The negotiations on China have involved exhaustive fact-
finding on exactly how China operates its economy.22 7 With respect to the
swap centers, the rules were neither public nor transparent, allowing offi-
cials to easily limit access to hard currency.228 The rules that China
published regarding its swap centers allowed for broad discretion in reject-
ing currency exchange requests, which in effect allowed officials to enforce
on-the-spot trade barriers.
In the ongoing talks between China and GATT, the working party
should not ignore Article X of GATT, which requires open publication of
226 China Slams Brakes on Machinery, Electronics Imports, Reuters, Dec. 31, 1993, available in
LEXIS, News Library, Allwid File (citing the official China Daily).
227 See supra note 15.
228 Nov. 1993 TREASURY REP., supra note 36, at 24.
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all laws and regulations that affect trade.229 A fair question is whether
China intends to honor this Article under its new unitary currency regime.
For example, in the case of restrictions on electronics and machinery im-
ports, will China's trading partners be alerted as to which electronics and
equipment are affected, or will the quotas act as "secret quotas," as the U.S.
has charged?230 Unless China can answer these questions, China should not
be allowed into GATT. Given China's track record of using currency
measures as import quotas, and the ineffectiveness of the GATT-IMF
framework with respect to currency issues, the working party should not
simply cave in to China simply because the WTO is under formation.
Instead, the working party should ask for a review period of at least a year
so that China's new inter-bank market can be studied in operation. The
"secret quotas" issue is indeed a real concern.
D. Protocol of Accession
It is difficult to predict whether China will be admitted to GATT or
the WTO.231 If admitted, however, GATT must decide on what concessions
to require. The accession process to GATT requires a negotiation process
followed by a protocol stating the terms under which accession is
granted.232 The protocol must include a detailed schedule of tariff reduc-
tions that the country agrees to follow. In China's case, the working party
did not begin the task of drafting its accession protocol during the Uruguay
229 Article X clearly prohibits the use of unpublished restrictions, regardless of whether the
restrictions are "monetary" or "trade" in character: "No measure... imposing a new or more burdensome
requirement, restriction or prohibition on imports, or on the transfer of payments therefor, shall be enforced
before such measure has been officially published." GAT CHARTER art. X, 2.
230 See U.S. Not Ready to Back China's Accession to New World Trade Group, Official Says, II
INT'L-TRADE REP. (B§NA) 617 (Apr. 20, 1994) (quoting an anonymous U.S. trade official as saying the
U.S. was reluctant to support China's bid to join the WTO: "We don't see how a WTO can have secret
quotas. There can't be secrets among WTO members about their import regimes. They have to be public;
they have to be transparent.").
231 The working party handling China's application continued to hold talks with China after the
Uruguay Round. On March 16, 1994, the working party met to hear China outline its blueprint for contin-
ued reform. Among the promises, China pledged to liberalize import restrictions on over 500 tariff lines,
make licensing and quotas more transparent, and once admitted to GATT. to phase out 80% of existing
non-tariff measures by 2000 and make the yuan fully convertible by 2000. China's performance was
generally welcomed, but the U.S. Trade Representative delegate said that the U.S. "cannot subscribe to an
artificial deadline" on China's application, and that the U.S. still had a long list of questions for China. See
Working Party on China Reconvenes; U.S. Will Not Commit to Firm Timetable, I I INT'L TRADE REP.
(BNA) 419 (Mar. 16, 1994).
232 Accession is provided for under Article XXXIII. GATT CHARTER art. XXXIII.
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Round.233 If China is deemed fit to enter GATT, the drafting of the acces-
sion document gives GATT members an opportunity to require periodic
review of China's currency practices.
The accession protocol offers GATT members a chance to solidify
their negotiations into a series of rules and procedural instructions. 234 For
most countries, the accession document is straightforward. For example,
the accession protocols for the Philippines235 and Columbia 236 are 2-3 pages
each, and contain few specifics aside from the tariff schedules. On the other
hand, the formerly communist countries, such as Poland,237 Hungary,238 and
Romania,239 agreed to more detailed protocols. At minimum, China's ac-
cession document should follow the example of the former East European
countries. Many trade analysts have drawn parallels between the accession
of the East Bloc countries and the case of China, but they are quick to note
that China presents a unique situation due to its size and economic differ-
ences.240
Nonetheless, the precedents of Poland, Hungary, and Romania could
be useful in terms of procedural requirements. In the protocols of accession
of all three eastern European nations GATT took the extraordinary step of
including special requirements related to foreign exchange. At the time,
Poland, Hungary, and Romania were not members of the IMF, so the
Balance of Payments Committee could not rely on IMF-supplied informa-
tion under Article XV.241 However, all three nations agreed that they would
233 In 1992, several developing nations represented in the working party supported the early drafting
of an accession protocol for China, but they were blocked by the U.S., the E.C., and other Western nations.
See U.S., EC Balk At Immediate Drafting of GATT Accession Protocol for China, 9 INT'L TRADE REP.
(BNA) 313 (Feb. 19, 1992).
734 Under Article XXXIII, accession is made based on "terms to be agreed between [the acceding
nation] and the CONTRACTING PARTIES." GATT CHARTER art. XXXIII. Some GATT entrants
(including Switzerland, Thailand, the Philippines, Hungary, Romania, and Poland) have acceded under
protocols of accession that specifically except them from various GATT provisions. See GATT, Analytical
Index, art. XXXIII, 18 (1989).
235 Protocolfor the Accession of the Philippines to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade,
GATT Doc. L/4901, BISD 26th Supp. 192 (Nov. 26, 1979).
236 Protocol for the Accession of Colombia to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, GATT
Doc. L4800, BISD 26th Supp. 194 (Nov. 28, 1979).
237 Protocolfor the Accession of Poland, BISD 15th Supp. 46 (Oct. 18, 1967).
238 Protocolfor the Accession of Hungary to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, BISD
20th Supp. 3 (Aug. 8, 1973).
239 Protocolfor the Accession of Romania to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, BISD
18th Supp. 5 (Oct. 15, 1971).
240 See John H. Jackson, State Trading and Nonmarket Economies, 23 INT'L LAWYER 891, 894
(Winter, 1989).
241 See GATT CHARTER art. XV, 2-6.
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follow "the intent of the General Agreement" with respect to exchange
matters, and also agreed to consult fully with the Contracting Parties if any
GATT member thought their currency system was violating the GATT
charter.242 The accession documents added an oversight mechanism: If
GATT members found that Poland, Hungary, or Romania took measures not
in accord with GATT principles, then the country would be required to enter
into a "special exchange arrangement" with the Contracting Parties, as pro-
vided for under Article XV(6).243
An important detail in the accession protocols of the three East
European nations was the required surveillance process. All three countries
were obligated to submit to annual reviews of their performance within
GATT.244 Included in these reviews was an examination of their balance of
payments situation, and whether their balance of payments warranted re-
strictions on imports. These annual reviews did not bring about strict
policing of currency measures, but at minimum they brought the balance of
payments question under an agreed-to framework for oversight. In this
way, the accession protocols set up a system for applying normative pres-
sure.
In the annual reviews, all three nations were required to provide up-
to-date information on their monetary situations, and complaints were filed
in several cases when this requirement was not met. For example, Poland
faced pressure in its sixth245 and ninth246 annual reviews for not providing
detailed information on its balance of payments situation. Romania faced
similar concern in its second review,247 Of course, members of the public
are not privy to these annual reviews, and both Poland and Romania fended
242 See BISD 15th Supp.. supra note 237, at 49; BISD 20th Suppl, supra note 238, at 6; BISD 18th
Suppl., supra note 239, at 8.
243 A "special exchange agreement" with GATT would require the country to uphold agreed-to
rules regarding foreign exchange, and would become part of the country's obligations under GATT.
GATT CHARTER art. XV, 6.
244 BISD, supra notes 237-39.
245 Poland had to answer questions regarding its reporting methodology. Consultation with Poland:
Sixth Review Under the Protocol of Accession, GATT Doc. L3946, BISD 20th Suppl. 209, 216 (Nov. 7.
1973).
246 GATT members apparently continued to prod Poland to provide better information on "errors
and omissions," capital movements allocated to trade versus capital movements allocated to "economic
cooperation" with other (East Bloc) nations, and activities of the central monetary authorities.
Consultation with Poland: Ninth Review Under the Protocol ofAccession. GATT Doc. L4483, B1SD 24th
Supp. 139, 148 (May 23, 1977).
247 Romania's balance of payments data were said to be deficient for not showing "invisibles and
long-term credit operations." Consultation with Romania: Second Review Under the Protocol of
Accession, GATT Doc. L4469, BISD 24th Supp. 149, 152 (Mar. 2, 1977).
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off the pressure in these meetings. But the mere fact that these reviews took
place periodically, and that some attention was paid to currency and infor-
mation access, should be enough to interest those in charge of drafting
China's accession protocol.
Given the leniency that GATT affords to less-developed nations,
GATT is not really able to force these members to adopt certain policies.
However, GATT's review process continues to be an important tool in per-
suading nations to adopt limited import barriers and in making these
barriers widely-known. In 1991, for example, the Balance of Payments
Committee oversaw an import surcharge scheme put in place by the Czech
and Slovak Federal Republic, and noted that this surcharge had been re-
duced and was intended to be abolished by the end of 1991.248 The
Committee also notified Turkey that it would face a full consultation
regarding its import restrictions taken for balance of payments purposes, 249
and warned the Philippines to notify GATT regarding its 9% import sur-
charge.250
Continued scrutiny of China's trade policies would be critical if
China was admitted to GATT. If the Uruguay Round proved anything it is
that holding China's trade regime up to international scrutiny has an inher-
ent value. In particular, the process brought about a heightened
understanding of China's actual trade practices. It is not an understatement
to say that this knowledge would probably not have come about through any
other means. The former dual-rate regime was so riddled with arbitrary
decision-making and internal procedures that it is unlikely observers could
have understood its workings simply by reading China's currency laws.
Moreover, GATT's multilateral forums served to bring unified pressure
against China's currency practices. A body like GATT was able to pene-
trate China's currency regime by asking questions over seven years, and
ultimately by withholding China's entry pending a currency reform. This
process of question and response should not stop simply because China
adopts a unitary rate. Nor should it stop if China is allowed to accede to
GATT.
Many GATT members are asking for China's accession protocol to
include a safeguard clause, whereby any nation suffering from a flood of
248 GATT, GATT AcrIvTES: 1991, 14 (July 1992).
249 Id. at 13.
250 Id.
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Chinese goods could elect to unilaterally limit Chinese imports.25 1 This
measure provides a big stick for countries to retaliate against China should
China dump its goods overseas. Not surprisingly, it has gained considerable
support. But ultimately the safeguard clause is a measure that attaches to
China's imports. As for opening China's market, this will only come about
through positive steps on the part of China. Consistent pressure from
GATT is important. One way to apply such pressure is to ensure that China
faces continued scrutiny regarding its restrictions on foreign exchange ac-
cess. This approach will safeguard the principle inherent in Article X:
namely, that China cannot rely on secret rules. If China is deemed fit to
enter GATT, the working parties should be careful to include a process of
annual review in China's protocol of accession.
V. CONCLUSION
China's former dual-rate currency mechanism raised many trade
questions for the U.S. and the working party handling China's application to
join GATT. The dual-rate structure enabled China to subsidize certain in-
dustries, and acted as a mechanism to tax foreign exchange transactions and
limit imports. Pressure to scrap the dual-rate structure built up during the
Uruguay Round of GATT talks, and ultimately China agreed to adopt a
unitary exchange rate shortly after the Uruguay Round ended.
Troubling aspects of China's unitary exchange rate, adopted in 1994,
are the problems of information access and fair enforcement. China still
faces many questions, including these: Will China continue to use currency
measures to limit imports? Will China be able to undermine the conces-
sions it offers to GATT (such as tariff cuts) by erecting administrative
barriers to hard currency access? If China's monetary reserves slide, will
GATT's Balance of Payments Committee be. able to steer China away from
import quotas and towards "price-based measures," as was resolved in the
Uruguay Round? These are fundamental questions that must still be
answered even under China's unitary exchange rate. Before China enters
GATT, at minimum GATT members should observe China's new unitary
rate and its inter-bank exchange market. A waiting period of at least a year
would be reasonable, during which time China should not be admitted to
GATE but should be willing to answer questions.
251 See China Agrees to Accept Conditions on Re-entry in GA 77. Brittan Says, I I INT'L TRADE REP.
(BNA) 384 (Mar. 9, 1994).
1994
102 PACIFIC RIM LAW & POLICY JOURNAL VOL. 3 No. I
If China can convince the working party that it is deserving of GATT
membership, and receive the needed two thirds vote from GATT members
for entry, then the Contracting Parties should be careful to commit China to
a series of annual reviews regarding balance of payments and information
access. Such a schedule for review should be outlined in the protocol of
accession. Careful drafting of this protocol is important because the GATT-
IMF framework offers few legal controls in the area of currency controls.
The main value of the GATT-IMF framework is procedural; Article XV of
GATT provides for a multilateral forum to examine a member's import re-
strictions taken to protect monetary reserves. China should not be allowed
to evade this process. GATT members should recognize that even if China
is admitted to the organization, the fact-finding process on China's trade
regime has only just begun.
